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Soğuk savaş sonrasında uluslararası ilişkiler literatüründe çok sık 
anılmaya başlanan İnsani Müdahale Kavramı kökleri çok eski çağlara dayanan 
haklı savaş anlayışının bir ürünü olmakla beraber bugün evrimleşerek şimdiki 
tartışmalı, standart tanımı olmayan halini almıştır. 
 
İnsani müdahale tartışmalarında meşruluk ve ahlakilik doğru orantıda 
işlenirken, müdahalenin hukuksallığı bu ilişkiye zıt bir değer olarak ortaya 
çıkar. Mevcut devletlerarası hukuk sistemine göre BM Sözleşmesinde belirlenen 
kurallar haricinde devletlerin birbirine karşı askeri güç kullanması ve 
birbirlerinin iç işlerine karışması yasaktır. Müdahale tartışmaları, hukukun 
üstünlüğünü öne sürenler ile hukukun ve egemenliğin insan haklarının önüne 
geçmesini eleştirenler arasındadır. Soğuk Savaş sonrası gerçekleştirilen her 
müdahale bu tartışmalarda yeni sorunlar ve başlıklar ortaya çıkarmıştır. 
 
Bu çalışmada ilk kısımda insani müdahale kavramının bir tanımı 
yapılmaya çalışılmış, tarihi açıdan meşru, ahlaki ve hukuksal gelişimi ortaya 
konmaya çalışılmıştır. İkinci kısımda günümüzde insani müdahale 
tartışmalarının meşruluk, ahlakilik ve hukuki açıdan sorun odaklı bir 
incelemesi yapılmıştır. Son kısımda ise mevcut sorunlara getirilebilecek çözüm 
önerileri ile insani müdahale için bir model sunulmaya çalışılmıştır. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Master Thesis 
 
Humanitarian Intervention: Legality, Legitimacy, and Morality  ̶  any Prospects 
for a Solution? 
 
Yunus Berker YETİŞTİ 
 
Dokuz Eylül University 
Institute of Social Sciences 
Department of International Relations 
International Relations Master Program 
 
Humanitarian Intervention concept which began to be referred so 
frequently in the international relations literature after the end of the Cold War 
is a product of Just War tradition which has its roots in ancient ages and 
Humanitarian Intervention concept has changed into the present status which is 
contentious and without a standard definition. 
 
While the legitimacy and morality are handled in direct proportion, the 
legality of the intervention emerges as a conflicting value against the former two 
in the humanitarian intervention debates. According to the existing international 
law, the states are banned from using military force against each other except for 
the situations specified in the UN Charter. Humanitarian Intervention debate is 
between those who argue that existing international legal rules should not hinder 
the protection of the basic human rights and required reforms should be done 
and those who assert that superiority of existing international law and 
sovereignty rights should protected and should not be violated. Every 
intervention in the Post-Cold War period produced new problems and topics in 
these debates. 
 
In this study, a definition of humanitarian intervention concept was 
endeavored to be made and its legitimate, moral and legal development was 
sought to be presented in terms of historical process in the first chapter.  In the 
second chapter, a problem focused observation of present day humanitarian 
intervention debates was established in terms of legitimacy, morality and legality. 
In the last chapter, a model for humanitarian intervention was sought to be 
presented through the solution propositions which can be suggested for the 
existing problems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Human rights and human security have gained increasing importance with the 
end of World War II. The Nazi atrocities showed to all to what extent the state can 
harm the civilians whether they are its own citizens or not. At the end of the war, the 
world witnessed for the first time the tribunals being established to bring before 
justice those responsible for the atrocities. The mark of a new era in terms of 
humanitarianism was sealed by the formation of the UN Charter which contained 
clauses concerning the protection of human rights. .  
However, the UN Charter included a dilemma. On the one hand, the Charter 
sought to lay down the rules for humanitarian action, though not clearly in terms of 
humanitarian intervention, while, on the other hand, it attributed unprecedented 
importance to the maintenance of inter-state order so as to prevent any future 
conflicts like the Second World War. With regard to the latter, the principles of state 
sovereignty and non-violation were reinforced. This dilemma did not surface much 
until the end of the Cold War.  
Meanwhile, many treaties on the protection of human rights were drafted and 
signed. However, their implementation has turned out be problematic due to the 
variations in states’ commitments.  
The debates on humanitarian intervention remained insignificant until the end 
of the Cold War. During that period the two opposing super powers generally 
remained silent on the human rights abuses within their own spheres of influence due 
to their strategic interests. The balance of power and nuclear deterrence kept two 
parties from intervening into one another’s sphere.  
The debate over the humanitarian intervention gained importance when the 
West desired to establish a new international order after the collapse of the 
communist bloc. During the Cold War the governments of the periphery (the so-
called Third World) had been supported by their patron states through economic and 
military aid for strategic reasons. With the end of the bi-polar system many of these 
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governments lost that key support and could not maintain their internal order. Ethnic 
rebellions or secessionist movements appeared against the ruling groups in those 
peripheral states.  
The Western engagement in these states caused much controversy in a 
number of important respects: decision making for the interventions, the timing of 
interventions, the conduct of operations, and commitments as well as motives of the 
intervening states. 
This controversy is deep and seems to last long as the phenomenon of 
humanitarian intervention itself is highly contentious. To start with, it is not clear 
whether it is limited to military intervention or not. More importantly, there is not a 
clear guide or a set of rules (i.e. criteria) for humanitarian intervention in the 
international law.  
While there is not a clear set of legal rules for intervention, state sovereignty 
was firmly institutionalized through the principles and practice which developed and 
evolved over the centuries. The intervention into the realm of the sovereign, which 
was entitled with supreme authority on its territory and population, conflicts with the 
long-standing practice and understanding of non-intervention. 
There are two views on the applicability of humanitarian intervention. The 
first one is the solidarism. According to the solidarists, the international community 
has moral commitment to help those in need, and they accordingly regard 
intervention into the sovereign’s territory as necessary and possible. This 
intervention need not be authorized by an international institution in the face of the 
urgency of human suffering.1 On the other hand, the pluralist view asserts that if 
such an intervention is required, it should be authorized by a competent body (e.g. 
the UN Security Council) without any motive other than helping people. The 
pluralists regard authorization as necessary to prevent the abuse of humanitarian 
discourse for self interest as much as possible. From the pluralist point of view, the 
                                                           
1
 Nicholas Wheeler and Timothy Dunne, “Hedley Bull's Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism of 
the Will”, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944), Vol. 72, No.1, 
1996,  p. 102 
3 
 
main concern in the implementation of the humanitarian intervention should be the 
compliance with the principles of international law, which uphold state sovereignty.2  
On the other hand, the solidarist view has different concerns within itself. The 
historical roots of present day understanding of humanitarian intervention can be 
traced back to the Just War tradition. In history the principle of Just War principle 
was first referred to by St. Thomas Aquinas who was then followed by many after 
him. The core of that principle is that a battle cannot be just if it is fought for 
aggrandizement of self-interest. For a war to be considered just, it needs to be fought 
in order to save others’ lives and prevent greater suffering as well as for self-defense. 
The Just War tradition developed certain criteria to regard a war as just. Briefly, they 
are: the authorization of war by right authority; the existence of a just cause; the right 
intention; the use of force as last resort; proportional use of force; and the 
requirement of reasonable hope.  
Present day interventionists, or moralists as they are called for their 
commitment to the humanitarian intervention as a moral duty, consider the above 
criteria as the basic requirements for a just and legitimate humanitarian intervention.   
However, even though the above criteria are truly fulfilled, there is a 
remaining problem. While the morality and legitimacy of the humanitarian 
intervention generally converge, the legality of humanitarian intervention clashes 
with the legitimacy. As will be explained, it is currently almost impossible for the 
humanitarian intervention to be deemed as both legal and legitimate.  
The Kosovo case and others used in this study show that both sides, namely 
the solidarists and pluralists, have valid concerns. There is an absolute need for 
intervention in cases of grave human suffering; on the other hand, states need to 
checked against their possible abuse of humanitarianism to further their material 
interests. 
This study shall attempt to define the problems of humanitarian intervention 
and suggest possible solutions to overcome them. It is based on a qualitative and 
                                                           
2
 Wheeler and Dunne, p. 94. 
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critical analysis of the literature view with a view to presenting the conflicting views 
on the issue and making some humble recommendations towards a solution. 
The first chapter covers the debates over the definition of humanitarian 
intervention. Having agreed with a certain definition as its basis, the rest of the 
chapter looks into the historical evolution of humanitarian intervention in terms of 
morality, legitimacy and legality with regard to a number of cases. The related 
development of international law is also presented. 
The second chapter defines the moral and legal problems of humanitarian 
intervention. The criteria for the legitimacy and morality of humanitarian 
intervention that were explained in the first chapter are deployed to highlight the 
current problematic topics. The latter are: selective action and non-intervention; 
motives versus outcomes debate; right authority; the proportionate action; the moral 
hazard of humanitarian intervention on minorities; and ‘nirvana fallacy’, which refers 
to the problem that those societies and governments which are faced with 
humanitarian disasters do not endeavor to help themselves, but wait for the Western 
intervention as a savior.  
Finally, in the third chapter, the above mentioned problems are evaluated 
through the help of case studies. A humble attempt is made to make some 
suggestions for the solution of those problems. They concern, among others, the 
realization of an agreement on the acceptability of humanitarian intervention, and the 
conduct of intervention. The chapter ends with side notes on the importance of 
establishing a post-intervention, peace building settlement. 
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FIRST CHAPTER 
 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: DEFINITION & HISTORICAL 
EVOLUTION 
 
Humanitarian Intervention has turned out to be a controversial phenomenon, 
which has given rise to many debates especially after the end of the Cold War. There 
are many views on the debate. However, what is certain is that humanitarian 
intervention threatens the international order.  This is due not only to the nature of 
the means of intervention, namely military means, but also to the problems 
concerning its justification, conduct and aftermath.  
This chapter aims to describe the concept of humanitarian intervention, and to 
provide a succinct account of its historical, moral and political evolution. A brief 
evolution of international law concerning the principles of state sovereignty and non-
intervention are also reviewed. The chapter benefits from various historical cases. 
However, it should be noted that these cases are not included with a view to judging 
whether they can be considered as acts of humanitarian intervention. Rather, they are 
used to better exemplify the subjects under consideration. 
 
I. DEFINITION OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
 
 Being a controversial issue, humanitarian intervention does not even lend 
itself to an agreement on its definition. As Jonathan I. Harney states there is no 
established rule and definition for ‘Humanitarian Intervention’ although there is an 
existing and evolving doctrine in the international society.3 There are various views 
on its definition as well as those on its resolution, process and consequences. The 
                                                           
3
 Jonathan I. Charney, “Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo”, The American Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 93, No.1, 1999, p. 836. 
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term humanitarian intervention consists of two interacting words, which are deemed 
to be complementary by those who support the existence of a humanitarian 
intervention doctrine. On the other hand, those who oppose the humanitarian 
intervention in terms of violation of existing sovereign rights and principle of non-
intervention describe the joint use of these two terms as an oxymoron. The 
compound term consists of two distinct terms. The word ‘humanitarian’ is an 
adjective in itself and it defines the quality of an action, decision or idea which 
encapsulates a range of concepts from humanitarian aid to military enforcement.4 
And as for the word ‘intervention’, it refers to   a range of actions from aid 
distribution to condemnation of a state due to its violation of basic human rights or to 
the extent of military intervention.5 When considered in terms of each concept, the 
joint use of such two terms, which are conflicting by nature, is a controversy in 
itself.6  
Eventually, it turns out that these two terms bring about two contradictory 
concepts: First, since the word ‘humanitarian’ is an adjective which is necessarily 
evaluated on normative grounds, what is humanitarian and what is not is not clear 
while deciding for the reasons of an intervention. Secondly, intervention is loaded 
with two ends of a range of actions from non-coercive actions to military (coercive) 
actions. Such a broad range of actions should necessarily be classified in terms of 
whether they are humanitarian intervention. However, even the starting point 
regarding the classification of actions is in itself a problem, since there is not a clear 
definition. Such ambiguity of a clear definition causes the most ferocious debates on 
the goals, limits and evaluation of humanitarianism. Consequently, ambiguity 
prevents a standardization of action by the UN, which is deemed to be the sole, self-
powered arbitrator in cases of humanitarian crises7. On the other hand, such a 
definition is not only limited to the categories of such action. It also necessarily 
includes the causes, application and evaluation of the aftermath.  
                                                           
4
 Saban Kardas, “Humanitarian Intervention: A Conceptual Analysis”, Alternatives Turkish Journal 
of International Relations, Vol. 2, No.3&4, 2003, p.25. 
5
 Kardas, p. 25. 
6
 C. A. J. Coady, “The dilemmas of militant humanitarianism”, Global Change, Peace & Security, 
Vol. 20, No. 3, 2008, p. 256 
7 Randolph C. Kent, “International Humanitarian Crises: Two Decades Before and Two Decades 
Beyond”, International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 5, 2004, p. 867. 
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A. The Problem with the Categorization of Actions 
 
The first question concerns the categorization of actions. ‘What actions fit in 
the definition of humanitarian intervention?’ While a particular view tries to confine 
it only to the military action, another one tends to include also non-military actions 
such as aid campaigns and economic sanctions, almost redefining it as humanitarian 
action. 
Patrick M. Regan defines all the action, including both military and 
economic, to topple a government in order to end a humanitarian emergency as 
humanitarian intervention.8 However, a modification should be made concerning the 
economic intervention, since the tools of economy is not only used for toppling down 
a government. Instead they have also been used to direct the developing countries’ 
governments to a line desired by the West.  Michael Wesley argues that the Western 
states, which were not more than donors of financial aid to the developing world 
after the World War II, discovered the power of the ‘carrot & stick’ functionality of 
the aids.  At the beginning of the 1980s the West began to use the latter   to amend 
policies of the developing countries by linking the aids to the conditions which 
required implementation or modification of the policies in these countries. In this 
way a check on the governments was established through neo-liberal policy tools as 
the World Bank and IMF.9 
Another scholar who incorporates economic sanctions into the definition of 
humanitarian intervention is Eric A. Heinze.10 Although he also defines humanitarian 
intervention within the narrow limits of military intervention, as it will be seen later, 
Heinze states that a coercive action either military or non-military (economic 
sanction) taken against another state by a state or a group of states can regarded as 
humanitarian intervention. Here, the point is that the action is taken against the 
                                                           
8
 Patrick M. Reagan, “Conditions of Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts”, The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 40, No. 2, 1996, p. 339. 
9
 Michael Wesley, “Toward a Realist Ethics of Intervention”, Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 
19, No.2, 2005, p. 60. 
10
 Eric A. Heinze, “Humanitarian Intervention: Morality and International Law on Intolerable 
Violations of Human Rights”, International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2004 
(Humanitarian Intervention: Morality and International Law), pp. 472–473.  
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sovereign will of the target state. This is also one of the assumptions of this thesis 
that humanitarian intervention is taken without the consent of the target state. 
Thomas Hill also defines humanitarian intervention as “a forcible interference in the 
governance of one legitimate state by another for the primary purpose of protecting 
the latter’s subjects from abuse and oppression by its own government.”11 However, 
he excludes interventions on failed states where the legal government no longer 
exists.  
Also The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 
supported by Canadian government, states in its report:  
Intervention for human protection purposes, including military   
intervention in extreme cases, is supportable when major harm to 
civilians is occurring or imminently apprehended, and the state in 
question is unable or unwilling to end the harm, or is itself the 
perpetrator.12 
 
The report mentions about intervention as inclusive of all the means, 
including the military ones. This is another view in terms of a broader definition. 
On the other hand, there is the view against such a broad definition. For 
instance, in his January 1995 report to the Security Council which is supplementary 
to his 1992 Agenda for Peace, the former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali emphasizes the separation between peace-making (peace building measures) 
and the use of force:  
Conflicts  the United Nations  is asked  to resolve  usually  have deep roots  
and have  defied  the peacemaking  efforts  of others.  Their  resolution  
requires  patient diplomacy  and the establishment  of a political  process  that 
permits,  over a period  of time, the building  of confidence and negotiated  
solutions  to  long- standing  differences.  Such processes often encounter 
frustrations and set-backs and almost invariably take longer than hoped. It is 
necessary to resist the temptation to use military power to speed them up. 
Peace-keeping and the use of  force  (other than  in  self-defense)  should  be  
                                                           
11
 Thomas Hill, “Kant and Humanitarian Intervention”, Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 23, No. 1, 
2009, p.222. 
12
 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, “The Responsibility to Protect”, 
2001, http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf  (21.08.2010), p. 16. 
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seen  as  alternative techniques and not as adjacent points on  a continuum  .  . 
13
 
 
Kofi Annan also defies the congregation of humanitarianism and military 
intervention: 
We must get right away from using the term ‘humanitarian’ to describe 
military operations… military intervention should not… in my view, be 
confused with humanitarian action. Otherwise, we will find ourselves 
using phrases like ‘humanitarian bombing’ and people will soon get very 
cynical about the whole idea. (Annan, 2000)14 
 
Aidan Hehir states that the use of force to serve humanitarian reasons has the 
potential to abuse humanitarianism at the expense of “political measures designed to 
bring about the settlement of the dispute between the parties”. He considers 
humanitarianism as “an altruistic, apolitical concern” while military action as 
belonging to the realm of politics. In that sense, any state may use humanitarian 
reasons as pretexts to use force against another state.15 
 On the other hand, there is a group of scholars who confines the concept of 
humanitarian intervention solely to military intervention. In their article “Can 
military intervention be “humanitarian”?” Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omar define 
humanitarian intervention as the external military intervention to remedy the crimes 
of the tyrannous government against its own public after other means are 
exhausted.16 
John Linarelli quotes J.L. Holzgerefe as:  
The threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of 
states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of 
the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, 
                                                           
13
 Tom J. Farer, “Intervention in Unilateral Humanitarian Emergencies: Lessons of the First Phase”, 
Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 18, 1996, p.13. 
14
 Aidan Hehir, Humanitarian Intervention: An Introduction, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 
2010 (Humanitarian Intervention: An Introduction), p. 13. 
15
 Hehir, Humanitarian Intervention: An Introduction, pp. 12-13. 
16
 Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omar, “Can Military intervention be humanitarian?”, Middle East 
Report, No. 187/188, 1994, p. 5. 
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without the permission of the state within whose territory force is 
applied.17 
 
Patrick Macklem also borrows the same definition to use in his 
“Humanitarian Intervention and the Distribution of Sovereignty in International 
Law”.18 
This list regarding the scholars who deem humanitarian intervention as the 
military action taken against a state for the relief of its own citizens is quite long. But 
the question to be asked should be: ‘Why do they employ such a limitation and 
exception?’ The answer for this question is provided by Oded Löwenheim.Oded 
Löwenheim  gives us a definition of humanitarian intervention as “an armed  action  
taken by one  state  to protect civilians other  than  its own  in  a foreign  country or 
jurisdiction.” In his explanation, Löwenheim states that the humanitarian action that 
covers “humanitarian aid and relief operations” does not cause dispute since they are 
held in the territory of the target state with its consent. However, military action 
without the consent of the target state is problematic. It provokes questions 
concerning the legality, legitimacy and morality of an intervention. 19 
Lastly, Alex Bellamy provides the same key, arguing that the issue of consent 
differentiates the solidarists who argue for the right of states to intervene into another 
state to stop a humanitarian emergency from the pluralists who assert that no reason 
can provide an exception to the principle of non-intervention among states20. The 
issue of consent is the key for the separation of two groups. If the target state invites 
the interveners to stop the humanitarian emergency, there is no problem for the 
pluralists, since it is the target states will. However, when the interveners impose the 
coercive action against the target state, then there is a serious problem from their 
perspective. 
                                                           
17
 John Linarelli, “When does might make right?”, Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 40, No.3, 
2009, p. 345. 
18
 Patrick Macklem, “Humanitarian Intervention and the Distribution of Sovereignty in International 
Law”, Ethics and International Affairs, Vol.22, No.4, 2008, p. 369. 
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Finally, a categorical definition for the humanitarian intervention to be used 
throughout the rest of this thesis might be established in the light of the above cited 
views. Firstly, there are two types of activities with humanitarian concern; 
humanitarian action and humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian action includes 
the consensual action by a state, a group of states, international governmental 
organizations (IGOs) or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for the 
development of human conditions. On the other hand, humanitarian intervention 
includes the military and non-military coercive action taken by a state or a group of 
states with or without a mandate of the UN against the will of target state.21 
Hereafter, these terms will be used as corresponding to those meanings. However it 
should be stated that although the terms of “military” and “non-military” are 
employed in the definitions, since the military intervention causes much more debate 
in the literature than the non-military intervention, where not stated explicitly, 
military intervention will be referred to in the hereafter. 
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II. A HISTORICAL VIEW ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
 
A. Just War Tradition 
 
Although the humanitarian intervention literature mainly focuses on the last 
20 years, a broader perspective would be more illuminating to apprehend the concept 
of humanitarian intervention. In that regard this section attempts to highlight the 
historical roots of the concept as far as the foundation of the Just War tradition. The 
endeavor of this section will be to present a descriptive evolution of the concept from 
the very beginning of human history till the end of the Cold War in terms of the ideas 
and practices.  
Even in the earliest forms of the military intervention, the decision makers 
sought a way to justify their actions through a moral concept, although this 
justification was not related to the common good of humanity as it will be seen later. 
For instance, in the famous Melian Dialogue, the Athenians justify their action 
against Melos during the Peloponnesian War on the basis of necessity and rule that 
drive the strong’s initiatives. In that, the Athenian’s did what the strong had to do and 
they were not inherently performing their actions but they were acting according to 
the moral duty for their own people in a manner that befits the realist thinking. 22 
This act of justification was never left aside during the historical evolution 
and found itself a sound place within the Just War tradition. The following part will 
present the evolution of this concept. However, such a description will not address 
the question of whether the resort to force required a justification or such a 
justification gave the ground to resort to force. On the other hand, this historical 
account may miss some important points and debates given the lack of space.  
To begin with, Just War tradition unites the domestic and international 
politics within the same scope.  
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In comparison to the Just War thinkers, the realist scholars like Hobbes and 
Machiavelli consider the human being as inherently evil for the original sin that they 
bear and unreliable; in their view human beings must be controlled under supreme 
authority of the state and the wellness, safety and interests of the state is more 
important than the establishment of the rights of society, because it is the states 
which can maintain order on earth.  
Just War thinkers also act on the original sin. However, unlike the realists 
who consider the international system as a plural entity, Just War thinkers mould a 
singular humanity out of this plurality, which consist of  people, families, clans, 
societies and states. Such different factions of society also bring about different ways 
of thinking on the decision making in the international affairs and use of force. 
Maybe the deepest difference is the one between the perceptions on the might of the 
state. Both realism and Just War tradition assume the state as the power holder on 
earth. According to the realist view, the might is the central drive for forceful action 
and resort to war; might give the right to wage war. On the contrary according to the 
“classical” Just War thinkers, might never gives right, but sometimes serve those 
who wants to establish the right and justice.23 The word “classical” was used and a 
classification for the Just War thinking was made, because there are two perceptions 
regarding the resort to force. The first view is the classical one in which the force is 
used by the state in order to ameliorate the suffering and human violations conducted 
by other sovereigns. As it can be deduced, this view violates the present day 
principle of non-intervention. On the other hand, the second view, namely the current 
Just War thinking, only allows resort to war in the event of self-defense. And this 
view actually has mutual relationship with and effects on the current international 
legal system.24 Although Just War tradition is acknowledged as a major pillar under 
the   current humanitarian intervention approach, it was not widely observed in the 
literature as a justification for humanitarian intervention until recently. 25 
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Just War tradition appeared on stage as a product of Christian religious 
thinking and was developed by the scholars of Christian and Western world. 
However, according to Jack Donnelly and Joseph Boyle, these origins lost their 
dominance when the Just War understanding turned out to be a universal concept 
embracing all mankind.26 Similarly, Mona Fixdal and Dan Smith state that the debate 
on the use of force and violent means in order to cease the suffering of others and 
peoples responsibility toward each other in the same regard has some roots in ancient 
Greek philosophy and also has equivalence in Quran and Islamic philosophy.27  
The first appearance of the concept extends in the history till 2000 years ago. 
The first examples of these thoughts were seen in Cicero’s writings which later 
affected St. Augustine of Hippo who is generally quoted as the progenitor of this 
school. Although Just War tradition is primarily based on Christian teachings, it was 
not on the stage during the time of Jesus. Jesus tried to establish a life among people 
based on mutual love and respect. And since this life was considered temporary, and 
the life after death was the real life to be cared, no conflict or war was worth to be 
fought. And, since war was opposite to the commands of God, no war was just. 
During his time and soon after the Christian pacifism became prevalent.28  
It was the second century AD, when people gave up their belief in pacifism as 
well as their hope for Jesus’ return to Earth. At this very point, Roman Empire was at 
constant threat from the surrounding barbaric clans and many Christians were 
serving in the Roman army, and the Church had to find a way to settle its relations 
with the Empire. For the Church, the Roman order that prevailed in Europe, North 
Africa and Anatolia was more preferable than the pagan rule and the authority 
divided among their chieftains. In 312 AD, Emperor Constantine converted to 
Christianity and Christianity was proclaimed to be the official religion of the Empire. 
With this new empowerment, the Church left the original teachings of Christ and 
created a new way which is based on the heroism and bellicose traits of the Old 
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Testament, and a new interpretation of the New Testament was also created to help 
the cause of the Church.29   
It was such a period when St. Augustine (354-430) wrote on the just war. He 
was critical of Pax Romana and Roman expansionism. For Augustine, violence was 
sinful depending on the motivations of the rulers. Force could only be justified “if the 
intention was just and the act was ordered by a just ruler”.30 There were four reasons 
which justified resort to war: “self-defense, to collect reparations or reclaim stolen 
property, if divinely sanctioned, and to maintain religious orthodoxy”.31 In 
Augustine’s idea of a just war, the role of authority in the use of force was crucial. 
He argued that war could only be waged by states due to the fact that it was the rulers 
who were given the duty to establish God’s rules on earth according to the 
fashionable belief in the period. On the other hand, Augustine also mentioned about 
the wickedness of mankind and the corrupt authorities who would soon be punished 
by God.32  
After the fall of Roman Empire and St. Augustine, “Just War” concept was 
maintained but not underlined until the Crusades when Just War concept was 
modified according to the wishes and interests of the Church. St Thomas Aquinas 
(1224-1274) wrote in the last years of the Crusades and based his works on those of 
St. Augustine.33 Other than the classification of Just War tradition as the old and 
current, the tradition was originally based on two categories, jus ad bellum and jus in 
bellum. Jus ad bellum is considered when we decide to resort to war and question our 
reasons for war. Jus in bellum is related to the means used and conduct of the war.34  
Thomas Aquinas did not employ such a separation, and his views were built 
on Augustinian ideas. Aquinas did not favor the “Crusade” understanding which was 
a “proactive” action; instead his views supported a “reactive” stand for the justness 
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of war.35 In the Summa Theologiae Aquinas stated three conditions to be met for a 
just war:  
Firstly, the authority of the ruler at whose command war is to be 
waged… Secondly, there is required a just cause: that is that those who 
are attacked for some offence should merit the attack… Thirdly, there is 
required, on the part of the belligerents, a right intention, by which is 
intended that good may be accomplished or evil avoided.36 
 
As in Augustine’s theory, Auqinas gives the right authority as a condition to 
be met. Aquinas states that only the sovereign of the state can decide on the use of 
force against an enemy since the sovereign is the primary authority responsible for 
the protection of his people. Despite the absence of a list on the just causes, Aquinas 
provides a key while stating that the just cause underlies any action which is a 
reaction to harm done by others to one’s state. As for the right intention, Aquinas 
clearly states the good intention which is purified from hatred, revenge or any 
political designs of worldly interests. Aquinas’s another contribution to the literature 
was his introduction of ‘The Doctrine of Double Effect’. According to his ‘Doctrine 
of double effect’ unintended negative consequences could be excused if four criteria 
were met: Firstly, the desired end must be good in itself. Secondly, out of all the 
effects, only the good one is intended. Thirdly, the good effect must not be the 
product of the evil effect. And lastly, the good of the good effect must outweigh the 
evil effect, which is known as the principle of proportionality in present day.37 
Although Aquinas cited the bad effects as excusable under the cited conditions, 
according to Robert Holmes, Aquinas wanted to warn people about the possibility of 
making more harm than the intended good.38  
After the Western Schism in 1378 and the subsequent division of the Church 
among three separate papacies, many crusades were declared against Christians. 
These crusades against “Christians” harmed and undermined the idea of a divine war, 
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and “natural law” emerged as a new concept and a reference point.39 Terry Nardin 
states that European moralists justified war to establish and protect law and rights, 
and self-defense was only one of these justifications. According to these moralists, 
rulers held a right and even a duty to establish certain laws outside their own 
territory. Nardin mentions two kinds of universal law at this point. Some of these 
moralists claim a “law of nations” (jus gentium) which is not an international law, 
but “general principles recognized in many different communities”. The law of 
nations is a body of norms applicable to all or most peoples. The second one and 
relatively more important one regarding the emergence of today’s international law is 
“natural law”. Natural law is composed of the precepts which can be known by 
reason and thus binding for all rational beings. Terry Nardin gives the following 
example to show the difference between them. Slavery was a permitted application 
and there was a norm about it since it was not forbidden. Since there was permission 
for slavery, it was not against the law of nations. However, slavery cannot be 
defended under natural law, since human reason could know the wrongness in such a 
fashion. However, Nardin adds that slavery was defended mistakenly under natural 
law.40 Natural law and law of nations are important concepts for history of 
international law, because the notion of universality enabled the emergence and 
prevalence of a common international law today.41  
During the 14th and 15th centuries theology lost its effect on the Just War 
tradition. Especially with the advent of the chivalric code, medieval knight’s duty to 
protect the non-combatants and the weak became an important issue in the conduct 
of war; jus in bellum. The 16th century reformation played an important role in jus ad 
bellum concept. The reformation eroded the effect of Christian theology, and 
established a partial secularism in scholars’ ideas for a common law of nations. 
Despite the division between the Protestant and Catholic Christians, the main 
division occurred among those religious philosophers who claimed that warring for 
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religion was the most just cause and the secular philosophers who thought of war in 
terms of natural law.42   
It was Francisco de Vitoria (1492-1546) who first argued the impossibility to 
know the justness of a war. In his design, divine revelation was not required to 
determine natural law. A war could be just or not, but it was only known by God 
himself. Briefly, the states could not wage a just war when they felt its justness and 
Vitoria suggested wide consultation before using force and this consultation should 
include those who are against the use of force. According to Vitoria, the Law of 
Nations and customary law should be equated with human positive law and not with 
the Natural Law. Vitoria argued that citizens should obey their sovereigns and every 
self-sufficient and independent community had the right to wage war. This argument 
along with the one that claimed the subjectivity of a just war paved the way for the 
claims of realists and legalists that wars waged by the states were just in themselves. 
As an example of his view of state interventions in the situations that violate the 
collective morality, Vitoria appraises Spain’s war against the aboriginals in America 
who had cannibal practices. Although he was critical of Spanish colonialism, he 
approved the Spanish intervention on the basis that it had been undertaken against 
the violation of a certain moral norm.43  
Vitoria was an important figure in the transformation of Just War tradition. 
After him the debate took the shape of the evolution which resulted in modern 
international law.  Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) another important figure in the 
tradition, also referred to as the father of international law, rejected the notion of a 
divinely sanctioned war. For him, there had to be a secular basis for the resort to 
force. His views were shaped by the holy wars of the 17th century, especially the 
Thirty Years War (1618-1648) when warring parties claimed divine rights and justice 
against each other.44 For Grotius such a law could exist not in the form of a divine 
one from heavens but as an outcome of formal agreement between states. And it 
must be for the good of humanity rather than the states that created it. In his 
argument for this law, the criteria for a Just War were “self-defense, the punishment 
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of wrongdoers, the enforcement of legal rights, the reparation of injuries and 
situations when there was no possibility of effective arbitration.”45  
After Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694) tried to formulate a 
regulation of state conduct and warfare increasingly with respect to positive law. He 
believed in the universality of law and argued that law was not particular to Christian 
societies.46 According to Pufendorf, the civil authority of the sovereign state is not 
subject to a higher authority. And he also argues that “duties to humanity,…, is best 
served through a states-system because rights and duties can only be established and 
maintained by a functioning sovereign state.”47 Pufendorf presented state system as 
the most rational way in the legal organization of the international system and also 
regarded civil society’s laws as not bound by abstract metaphysical laws.48  
Emmerich Vattel (1714-1767) another important figure in the evolution of 
international law endeavored to establish a codification for sovereign equality and 
inviolability. He argued that “war could not be waged justly on behalf of foreign 
citizens as this created an easily abused pretext for intervention.” 49  War could only 
be just in the event of self-defense.  
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was suspicious about the power of natural law 
and moral persuasion, because states were not “subject to a common external 
constraint”.50  However, he wanted to add normative view into “clear legally binding 
treaties between states.”51 In his view, common morality based on the natural law 
would establish higher authoritarian norms than the authority of the sovereign state. 
Therefore, if the “perpetual peace” was to be achieved, it could only be ensured by 
state’s subordination to international and cosmopolitan law. This could enable the 
extension of moral duties to all mankind beyond the fellow citizens.52 
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After the French Revolution (1789), the emphasis on jus ad bellum, the 
reasons for the use of force, was left aside and the debate went over the jus in bellum, 
the conduct of war. This prevalence of jus in bellum on jus ad bellum continued until 
the mid-twentieth century. Prominent scholars, namely Hegel, Meinecke and 
Clausewitz, generally ignored the question of right authority because of their belief 
that states possessed this right. The break of the First World War destroyed any 
claims for justness and legitimacy since there were no valid arguments. Every 
aggression was defended as self-defense during the Great War, as Kaiser Wilhelm II 
did for the invasion of Belgium in 1914.  After the World War I, The League of 
Nations was established, asking for the submission of any dispute to the organization 
before resorting to war. However, it proved to be a failure since the revisionist states 
as well as Britain and France acted against the rules of the organization. After World 
War II which broke to allegedly tackle the unjust settlement of the WWI, the Cold 
War started, and the Just War tradition along with the debate over the natural law and 
positive law lost its importance against Realpolitik. However, the foundation of the 
UN marked an important point for the development of the international law on the 
use of force and sovereign inviolability. The evolution of international law involved 
the incorporation of many key prescriptions of the Just War tradition.53 With the end 
of the Cold War period and the balance of power, the states returned to the practice 
of intervention this time under the name of humanitarian intervention. At this point, 
the interventionists sought ways to justify and legitimize the practice of humanitarian 
intervention before the international community. And they have increasingly referred 
back to the criteria of the Just War tradition in that endeavor.  
As much as the modern Just War thinking enabled the development of current 
international legal system, the original one survived long enough to be referred by 
those scholars who spoke about the rightness of waging a humanitarian war at the 
point when second millennium passed and the third has come. The Just War criteria, 
which are prevalent today, are divided into two: Jus ad bellum and Jus in bellum, 
with the former being related to the cause of war, and the latter concerning the 
conduct of war. The common criteria for jus ad bellum are; right (legitimate) 
authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportionality and reasonable 
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hope.54 These criteria are still deemed effective today. As to the first criteria of right 
authority, he was the Pope who held it in the early times. Later it was transferred to 
the rulers, and now is claimed to be vested in the UN, sometimes NATO and even 
every state with a just cause.55 Concerning the criteria of just cause, in the classical 
Just War thinking involving St. Augustus, Aquinas and their followers, self defense 
was not a just cause, for it was an action to defend an earthly entity like one’s own 
goods, body and life. However, if someone defended another person it would be a 
just cause, since it was an act of sacrifice without selfish incentives. It was also 
deemed to be a duty to help others in Christendom. However, that thinking in itself 
represents the problematic nature of the humanitarian intervention. There are two 
conflicting codes in Christianity on violence. The first view is that no harm should be 
done to anyone. This view conflicts with the view concerning the just cause that a 
man should help everyone whenever possible in defense of others. This conflict is 
very similar to the one ongoing today: whether to intervene to help others or not? 
The main point defended by the pro-interveners is that acts like genocide and 
massive human rights violations, which shock the human conscience, are beyond any 
legal boundaries and impose every man on earth a duty to intervene.56 At this point 
Kofi Annan states: 
To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of international order 
is the use of force in the absence of a Security Council mandate, one 
might say: leave Kosovo aside for a moment, and think about Rwanda. 
Imagine for one moment that, in those dark days and hours leading up to 
the genocide, there had been a coalition of states ready and willing to act 
in defense of the Tutsi population, but the council had refused or delayed 
giving the green light. Should such a coalition then have stood idly by 
while the horror unfolded?57  
         
The criterion of just cause is related to the decision to wage war and to inflict 
injury on people whether they are foe, neutral or friend. It is an assessment of the 
situation which will entail inflicting such a blow. On the other hand, the criterion of 
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right intention is about the motives behind the act. In its clearest definition, the right 
intention refers to the act without an interest, profit, power or opportunity to gain 
comparative superiority for any strategic design.58 Although motives cannot be 
known by other people, in terms of Just War thinking, their importance lies in the 
fact that God is omniscient and nothing can be hidden from Him. Even the act is not 
good as it was first planned, they must be meant on good intention.59 The motives are 
still an issue within the Just War terminology and will be part of the debate in the 
later stages of this study. 
Another criterion of Just War tradition is the last resort. According to the 
criteria, force is usable “only if all peaceful means are exhausted”. However, as it 
will also be explained later on, the outbreak of humanitarian emergencies may render 
that criteria obsolete since they require a quick response.60 
Just War tradition has also two other criteria which have consequentialist 
traits. The first one is that the ‘Just War’ must have “proportionality”, meaning that 
the action should bring more good than harm. In other words, the criterion actually 
urges a comparison between the possible results of intervention and non-intervention. 
On the other hand, such a war may only be just if there is sufficient proof that the 
military operation will be concluded with a victory. Then, any futile action is 
prevented before acting. Such a criterion requires a realist calculation of a possible 
victory or failure. This criteria still takes its place in the debate on intervention versus 
non-intervention.61 
Lastly, as mentioned above, the Just War tradition also covers the criteria 
regarding the conduct of war; jus in bellum. However, these criteria are almost 
unanimously accepted in international relations, and thus are relatively free from 
controversy. To mention briefly, in terms of ‘discrimination’ criteria, force is 
allowed to be used only against aggressors and combatants. Secondly, 
‘proportionality’ criterion requires the use of minimum necessary military force to 
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achieve the desired result. And lastly, ‘just conduct’ criterion envisions that during 
the use of force all the laws for the use of force should be respected.62  
These criteria are known today as the criteria of a just war. They occupy 
substantial space within the discussions of morality and legitimacy debates on 
humanitarian intervention. As mentioned before, these criteria were derived from the 
natural law thinking, which is seen as the basis for legitimacy of an intervention. 
However, the intervention proves to be problematic, when it conflicts with the 
present international law developed on the positive law idea pioneered by Hugo 
Grotius. The following section will seek to present the current regulations and law 
regarding the use of force, which constitute the basic source of problems in the 
humanitarian intervention debate.   
 
B. Evolution of the Legal Structure and State Practices 
 
1. A Historical Account  
 
The current international state system is generally considered to have been 
founded with the Westphalia Treaty in 1648. The most important fact about the 
Westphalia Treaty and the system referred to by it is that the concept of state 
sovereignty and the corollary principle of non-intervention are based on this treaty.  
Mohammed Ayoob, one of the prominent proponents of state sovereignty and 
principle of non-intervention, defines sovereignty “as authority (the right to rule over 
a delimited territory and the population residing within it”.63 In another view the 
sovereignty is sourced from the will of the society living on that specific territory. 
For example, John Stuart Mill states:  
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a people the most attracted to freedom, the most capable of defending and making good 
use of free institutions, may be unable to contend successfully for them against the 
military strength of another nation much more powerful. To assist a people thus kept 
down is not to disturb the balance of forces on which the permanent maintenance of 
freedom in a country depends, but to redress that balance when it is already unfairly and 
violently disturbed.64 
 
  On the other hand, the principle of non-intervention is defied mainly by 
moralists to supersede absolute sovereignty of the state. As Jennifer M. Welsh states, 
the main tension of the humanitarian intervention lies on this conflict between the 
international law safeguarding state sovereignty through the principle of non-
intervention and the international norms shaped by humanitarian needs to be met 
through the use of force.65 
The international legal system based on the Westphalian principles still 
prevails with some modifications. However, in less than two centuries after the 
settlement of the Westphalia Treaty the difference was so obvious that there was an 
order, whether imperfect or not. The legalization process in international relations 
presented a total change. On this issue, Costas Douzinas paraphrases Nietzsche: “if 
God, the source of natural law, is dead, he has been replaced by international law”.66 
Despite being rooted for centuries, the principle of non-intervention, being a legal 
norm, was open to violations. And it was abused by states since its inception, for 
every military action taken by a state was at the expense of the other’s sovereignty.67 
As it was stated before, all of them were attempted to be justified in terms of direct 
self defense as a basic right to use of force, or as a an act perpetrated on the criteria 
of Just War Tradition. 
The Westphalian concept of sovereignty was not totally uncontroversial. 
Especially after the Europan powers embarked on their military conquests beyond 
Europe, they considered themselves as the sole authority to consider the sovereign 
qualities of the non-European powers. In other words, the situation was that the 
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imperial western powers were holding the ‘right’ to determine the qualities of other 
states; they judged whether to perceive the latter as ‘sovereigns’. Western 
‘sovereigns’ militarily invaded the territories in Africa and India. In other territories 
like Ottoman Empire, China and Japan where the rule of the local sovereign was not 
totally ignored, the West did not recognize and accept the domestic regulation of 
these territories and declared the principle of extraterritoriality for their subjects. The 
sovereigns of these states remained in power as inferior rulers of the lands which 
would be colonized.68 As David Chandler quotes David Held, “might became 
right”.69  
The present day debate of the abuse of state sovereignty also existed in the 
19th century. However, the departure point to violate sovereignty was not the 
‘human’ but the ‘minority’ rights. If Mohammad Ayoob had lived a century ago, he 
wouldn’t have had to change his study area but the vocabulary. It wouldn’t be a 
coincidence that most of these violations occurred over the Ottoman lands which 
composed the territory of the infamous ‘Eastern Question’. The subsequent events 
cast light on the issue. 
 The line begins with the 1821 Greek Uprising. Shortly, Mehmed Ali Pasha, 
the governor of Egypt defeated the Greek rioters in 1826. Then combined fleets of 
France, Britain and Russia destroyed the Ottoman fleet in Navarino in 1827. 
Mehmed Ali Pasha’s armies were forced to withdraw. With the European 
intervention, the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire was broken and Greece 
was founded. After further confrontation between Russia and the Ottoman Empire on 
the autonomous rights for the Balkans, the war ended with 1829 Edirne (Adrianople) 
Agreement which created a greater Greece.70  Of course, the point in this case is not 
whether the Greeks acquired a just independence or not. The matter is that the great 
powers, by exploiting the issue of minority rights and upsetting the principle of non-
intervention, broke the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.  
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The second case of this line is the Crimean War. Crimean War, although a 
military confrontation, is actually a result of the rivalry between the two major 
powers of the time. On the one side, there was France under the rule of Napoleon III, 
then the president who had deep ambitions to proclaim his emperorship, was getting 
his main support from the Church and the clergy. When the problem of the ‘Sacred 
Places’ appeared, he did not miss the opportunity to strengthen its relations with the 
Church as the protector of the Catholics in Jerusalem. On the other side, Russia and 
Czar Nicholas I, having plans to have influence on the Ottoman lands, took a 
position of guardianship of the Orthodox rights beyond Russia. These two forces 
with different designs other than the religious rights deepened a minor problem and it 
led to the Crimean War in 1853.71 The discourse and the motives were very different 
from each other, the debate of which still continues today regarding the problem of 
abuse of human rights. 
The last case of the period is the bloody fight between Maronite Christians 
and Druses in Lebanon in 1860. Maronites rioted against the land barons and they 
were suppressed by Druse fighters in a bloody way. France, the sworn guard of the 
Catholics in the Ottoman lands, established a European force half of which consisted 
of the French troops which intervened and occupied Beirut and its region. The actual 
motive of France was to establish its own rule in Syria. However, it was prevented by 
the Sublime Port with British support.72 
These three are just a few examples of many cases to show the violation of 
principle of non-intervention and state sovereignty under a pretext. These cases are 
meaningful to show the evolution of these violations. A century ago state sovereignty 
was violated in the name of minority rights. Now, it is claimed by pluralists like 
Mohammed Ayoob that state sovereignty is jeopardized to protect human rights. 
However, there is a difference. Whereas there is major agreement on the issue of 
abuse in the 19th century and especially during the period of the Eastern Question, 
today the topic is too contentious to decide on.  
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Above mentioned system, which upheld might as the right, could not sustain 
itself in that way. The non-Western states, especially Japan, had relative 
development and modernization at the end of the 19th century. Western states had 
fear that with a possible decline in Western power, the non-Western states would act 
in the same way as the West did and could try to have gains through the use of 
power. They needed to settle and stabilize the international society. The first Hague 
Conference is a proof of this view. China, Japan, the Ottoman Empire, Persia and 
Siam were among the attendants. The defeat of Russia by Japan in 1905 shocked 
European powers, and their confidence in their power and racial superiority was 
shaken by this defeat. Upon this defeat, the second Hague Conference in 1907 was 
the first truly international gathering of modern sovereigns. The non-Westerns 
outnumbered the Western states in the conference. After this transformation, 
European power decadence with the turmoil of the Great War and the fear to lose the 
colonies led to a total change in the European view of the international system. This 
change might be described as from ‘might is right’ towards the supremacy of 
international law. This was the point, when the West was not able to have no more 
territorial gains but tried to hold what it already had. With the foundation of League 
of Nations, colonial powers’ sovereignty was restricted with the introduction of the 
mandate system, according to which colonial powers had to act with a view to the 
interests of their subjects. However, the new establishment promoting the Wilson’s 
principles did not end the racial discrimination for the equality of the sovereigns. The 
rejection of Japan’s proposal to include a clause for racial equality into the League of 
Nations Charter was a proof of that.73 The sovereign equality came along with the 
US dominance after the Second World War. US policy planners realized that Britain 
would never reclaim its global role and the US had to take over its role. The new 
situation required the abolition of colonial and imperial mechanisms in order to 
establish the new institutions to manage international relations. The UN Charter 
system has become the first attempt to create a law-bound international system which 
assumes the equality of all nation-states.74 
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The UN Charter Article 1 (2) underlines ‘the respect for equal rights and the 
principle of self-determination’. Article 2 (1) states the sovereign equality of all 
members.75 These principles are also repeated in Article 55.76 Basic presumption of 
the international law since 1945 is that states have been prohibited from using force 
or threatening the others to use force according to Article 2 (4). The only exception 
to this prohibition is the self defense as defined in Article 51 and collective security, 
according to which the Security Council authorizes the use of force for common 
security through a resolution to be taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
However, the UN system has not been a truly equal one. The internal working of the 
UN mechanism, with its assumption of the sovereign equality of all states, actually 
includes inequality. The Security Council and the right to veto of the five permanent 
members, the US, Russia, China, France and Britain, is the cause of this inequality.77 
Although, the term veto is referred in the Charter, it is implicit in Article 27 (3).78  
Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by 
an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of 
the permanent members ; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, 
and under paragraph 3of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain 
from voting.79 
 
The UN mechanism to take actions has always been problematic due to two 
reasons: the first one is the above mentioned veto problem and the other one is the 
inherent nature of the UN system which is not able to cast new laws. If we return to 
the veto problem, the possibility of veto has always blocked the full operation of the 
UN. For example, in Kosovo operation of the NATO in 1999, the Western states did 
not bring the issue before the Security Council since they were sure that Russia 
would veto such a western operation in the Balkans.80 
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On the other hand, according to Article 27 (2) of the Charter, Security 
Council may only vote on the non-procedural matters:81 “Decisions of the Security 
Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven 
members.”82 However, since the fact of deciding whether an issue is a procedural or 
not is itself a non-procedural matter, the Charter grants the members a ‘double-veto’ 
power. In this way any attempt to treat a matter as procedural might be vetoed by a 
permanent member if it accepts it as non-procedural.83 
If we return to the second problem, as mentioned above, the fact is that the 
Council’s powers are used in a reactive manner, meaning that they are used in case 
of a breach of peace and act of aggression. The powers of the Council were designed 
for the maintenance of peace, and not as a tool to enforce the law. The Council does 
not have the authority to create binding legal precedents or to enforce a new law. As 
defined in the article 38 of the Statute of International Court of Justice, the main 
sources of international law are: 1) treaties; 2) practice; 3) general principles of the 
law.84 The Security Council only watches for the breaches.85 And this fact is one of 
the departure points of those NGO’s and scholars who argue for the establishment of 
a new order with power to act in a proactive manner.86 In this way, the institute to 
replace the UN will have the power to enforce international legislation to intervene 
for humanitarian reasons and to punish the crimes against humanity. 
Despite the discrimination it makes among its members as the permanent five 
and the others, the UN system constitutes a historical turning point since it accepted 
the sovereign equality of the non-western states. This equality concerned the 
legitimacy of being a sovereign in the legal sense of the term, not in the economic 
and military spheres. This agreement on equality was further confirmed with two UN 
resolutions: “the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic 
Affairs of States and Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty of 21 
December 1965 (Resolution 2131 (XX)) and the Declaration on Principles of 
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International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations of 24 October 1970 (Resolution 
2625 (XXV)).” Especially the latter one establishes that every state is equal in 
sovereign rights, and that no others have the right to intervene to each other’s 
domestic affairs and they are forbidden to use or threaten to use force  against each 
other’s will and in violation of international law.87  
The violation of sovereignty, as mentioned above, goes as far back as to the 
primitive forms of the state. And despite all the mentioned settlements and 
resolutions of the modern period, there have been three violations before the end of 
the Cold War: Indian intervention in Bangladesh in 1971, Vietnam’s intervention in 
Cambodia in 1978 and Tanzania’s Intervention in Uganda in 1979.  
 
a. Indian Intervention to Bangladesh 
 
After the secession of Pakistan from India in 1948, Pakistan has never 
become a completely united country in terms of economic, social and cultural 
interaction of the population. In Western Pakistan the majority of the population was 
Muslim, and this part had interaction with the neighboring Muslim states like Iran 
and Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Oman over the 
Persian Gulf. Due to their cultural and economic interactions with India, and 
Pakistan (Western Pakistan) government’s ignorant policies towards them, Bengalis 
(Eastern Pakistan) felt themselves singled out and were also treated as the West 
Pakistan Government’s colonial outpost. The discriminative policies bore a 
movement called the Awami League, which requested greater regional autonomy for 
the Eastern Pakistan. In 1969, the first elections were held to choose the first civilian 
government of Pakistan. Awami League took the majority of the votes and did not 
accept parity rights claim of the Pakistan People’s Party on drafting the new 
constitution. Due to the intransigent manner of the Awami League, Pakistan 
government feared of the secessionist tendencies of the League and martial law was 
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declared with the deployment of government troops on the streets of East Pakistan. 
Although the talks were held between the East and the West Pakistan leaders and 
commanders, no results were achieved. On 25 March 1971, West Pakistan army 
attacked on the East in order to end the rebellion of the Awami League and its 
supporters.88 
Although the international society showed reactions on the humanitarian 
issues in East Pakistan, the main view was that it was Pakistan’s internal problem 
and would remain its own sovereign sphere. Then Secretary General of the UN, U 
Thant acknowledged this issue as belonging to the domestic jurisdiction of Pakistan 
as befitting the UN Charter Article 2(7) in his letters to President Yahya Khan of 
Pakistan on 5 and 22 April 1971. The US policy on the issue is a good example. 
Nixon administration was calling for international assistance for the suffering people 
in East Pakistan while it was also supplying arms for the Pakistani government and 
not condemning it.89 Mass murders and rapes were causing refugee flows to India. 
This was a problem for social and economic stability of India and India was calling 
the international society to take action and stating its resoluteness to intervene for its 
own security. However in those days the Cold War confrontations made the USA 
and China to align with Pakistan and the Soviet Union with India. Such a 
confrontation would not bring about the necessary international action. On 3 
December Pakistan launched an attack on India who already had a plan to attack on 
Pakistan on 4 December. Upon Pakistan’s attack on India, the Security Council met 
urgently.90 Before the Security Council, India defended its use of force as self-
defense in terms of Article 51 of the Charter, since it was Pakistan who attacked first. 
Although Indian resort to force was defendable as self-defense, it is known from 
certain Indian actions such as  the training of Bengali guerillas, and Indira Gandhi’s 
rhetoric that Indian intervention would also have occurred if Pakistan had not 
attacked.91  
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b. Vietnam’s Intervention to Cambodia 
 
The relations between Vietnamese and Cambodian people have always been 
problematic throughout history. After Khmer Rouge came to power, Pol-pot first 
tried to find a solution to the existing territorial conflicts in reply to Vietnamese 
attempts. Although there had been talks to settle disputes and reported clashes on the 
borders in 1975, no results could be achieved. Two parties had different views on the 
borders. Vietnam adopted the post-colonial international society’s view of uti 
possedetis as it established the territoriality as the basement of the state. On the other 
hand, Cambodia followed an ethno-nationalist view and maintained its claims on the 
Mekong Delta and the area around Saigon. Between the years 1975-1977 Khmer 
Rouge held many attacks on Vietnamese people in Cambodia and border villages. 
Their policy was to flame the hatred among Cambodian people on Vietnamese and to 
reclaim Mekong Delta and Saigon area referred by them as “Kampuchea Krom” 
(Lost Territories). Their dream was to realize the greater Cambodia, which was 
further flamed by the supra-nationalist waves. For this end, Khmer Rouge attacked 
the Vietnamese villages to create hatred among the Vietnamese against the 
Cambodian people and Khmer Rouge became successful in this plan. 92  
In September 1977, upon Cambodian attack on Tay Ninh province, Vietnam 
decided to resort to military force. In October, 50.000 Vietnamese troops marched 
into Cambodia, but this military show up had to stop out of fear of a Chinese attack 
on Vietnam. In February 1978, Vietnam made a peace offer which envisioned the 
territorial integrity and border security of both states, but Pol Pot, the leader of the 
Khmer-Rouge, declined it and continued the war. Upon this development the 
Vietnamese government realized that it had to topple Pol Pot. For this reason, 
Vietnam used the human rights and violations propaganda for the first time against 
Cambodia. The 12 Cambodian Divisions on the border and the Chinese threat on 
Northern borders were pressing on the Vietnamese government. On the Christmas 
Day of 1978, Vietnam divisions attacked Cambodia. Cambodian Army was easily 
defeated. On the other hand, Vietnamese army had a maneuver. The National 
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Salvation Front was declared to have been established two days before the the fall of 
Pol-Pot government. Hanoi Radio also announced that the fight against Pol Pot for 
revolution was realized by the National Salvation Front. In this case, Vietnam could 
declare that it had nothing to do with the government change in Cambodia and 
everything was realized by Cambodian people for more freedom. A new government 
was founded in Cambodia. However, despite his defeat, Pol Pot was seeking for the 
international support against Vietnam. His Foreign Minister Leng Sary called for the 
Security Council meeting to condemn Vietnam. However the Soviet Union and 
Czechoslovakia, in support of Vietnam and the new Cambodian government, defied 
the demand as the Pol Pot regime as a government did not exist anymore. 
Nonetheless, this was a procedural matter as it was directly related with the 
operational mechanism of the Security Council. According to Article 27 (2) of the 
UN Charter, seven affirmative votes are enough for the decision93 Then, the Security 
Council met nine days later on 11 January 1979 to take a decision on the conflict, 
despite the countervote of the Soviet Union for the UN Security Council action on 
Cambodia against Vietnamese interests.94  
When the international society condemned Vietnam, it did not use 
humanitarianism as a justification. It regarded the use of force as an act of self-
defense against the attacks from the Cambodian territory in 1977-78 as well as the 
overthrow of the Pol Pot regime as the work of the National Salvation Front.95 
 
c. Tanzanian Intervention to Uganda 
 
The last example of the use of force during the Cold War, which is included 
in the humanitarian intervention debates, is Tanzania’s use of force in Uganda in 
early 1979. In 1971, Idi Amin seized power and established his dictatorship; this was 
a bloody rein as Amnesty International declared that 300.000 people were killed 
between 1971 - 1979. The period was also a shame for African Continent. However, 
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African states did not intervene by using Article III of the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU), according to which intervention in the internal affairs of member 
states is prohibited.96  
The tension between Tanzania and Uganda began when Tanzanian President 
Julius Nyerere condemned Idi Amin for seizure of power through a military coup in 
1971. Nyerere was against military coups in Africa and the former leader of Uganda, 
Milton Obote, who had been democratically elected and deposed by Idi Amin, was a 
friend to Tanzania President. Nyerere viewed Obote as the legitimate leader of 
Uganda. Tanzania provided asylum for Obote and his 1000 soldiers. In 1972 Obote’s 
soldiers launched an invasion of Uganda to seize the power for Obote, but they failed 
due to Libya’s support of Uganda and since Tanzania did not support the soldiers. 
And after the incident, Tanzania and Uganda signed the Mogadishu Agreement on 5 
October 1972 and accepted not to commence military operations against each other. 
Until October 1978, Tanzanian president Nyerere continued his sharp criticism of Idi 
Amin. In October 1978, Ugandan army invaded Tanzanian territory and occupied the 
Kagera Salient. Uganda defended its invasion on the pretext that the territory had 
belonged to Uganda according to the old colonialist division between German and 
British spheres of influence. The actual reason behind the invasion was that there 
were dissidents and deserters in the Ugandan Army. In order to conceal this erosion 
in his power, Idi Amin allowed his troops to follow these deserters into Tanzania.97 
Tanzania gave a strong and decisive response and drove these forces back to Uganda. 
Although Idi Amin requested ceasefire, Nyerere did not accept this as well as the 
mediation offers of Nigeria and Libya. Having finished the first phase of the war, 
Nyerere initiated the second phase of the plan. According to that, the exiled political 
dissidents of Idi Amin met in Dar es Salaam in the end of October 1978 and built up 
the Front for the National Salvation of Uganda. On the other hand, Obote’s soldiers 
were also armed and trained by the Tanzanian army. On 13 January 1979 Obote 
called on Ugandans to launch an armed struggle against Idi Amin regime. In April, 
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Amin’s forces were scattered and Tanzanian army initiated an offensive operation to 
take all Uganda back from Amin regime for Obote.98  
Tanzania was seen to have forcefully overthrown the Amin regime. Although 
Uganda called for the Security Council action on the issue, the OAU countries and 
also the great powers did not want to hear Uganda before the Security Council. On 
the other hand, Tanzania did not use the necessity of a democratic regime change in 
Uganda as a reason to justify its actions. Instead, it used the self-defense clause of the 
UN Charter as Uganda attacked the Tanzanian soil first. The subsequent war on the 
Ugandan territory and toppling of Idi Amin were defended in terms of the further 
threat caused by the Amin’s regime.99 
In all these three cases of military intervention of the Cold War period, each 
was defended on the basis of self defense before the international community. And 
except for Tanzania, these interventions were quickly condemned by the 
international society as a violation of the Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter.100 Although 
some humanitarian effects came out of them, no attempt was made to justify the use 
of force was with regard to the human rights or the democratic rights of the people 
on the intervened territory. This is in contrast to the period in the 19th century where, 
as illustrated above, states intervened to other countries under the pretext of minority 
rights.  
As it might be seen, the summary of legal evolution told until here has been 
the legal evolution of the law and institutions among states. This account was built 
up on the view that “[s]tates and states alone enjoy a locus stansi in the law of 
nations: they are the only wearers of international personality.”101 Since the subject 
of this study is humanitarian intervention and it is the human and states which is in 
the center of the discussion, a brief story of the legal debate should also be given by 
including the human. 
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2. Human in International Law 
 
After World War I, the protection of groups within the states was recognized 
on the basis of the Wilsonian principles, Since one of the main reasons of World War 
I was the presence and insurgency of large minority groups in the empires on 
European soil, and due to the fact that the aim of Wilson’s principles was to 
reestablish a stable international system, the Wilsonian Principles invoked the 
principle of self-determination in order to ensure that minority groups, at least the 
larger ones, could declare freedom and separate themselves from the main state and 
in that way the possibility of another war would be avoided. To that end, in the Paris 
Peace Conference, the victors of the Great War imposed such treaties on the defeated 
to ensure fair treatment of the minority groups within their states and reconfigured 
the territories of the states where they saw as necessary. However, the Nazi atrocities 
proved the inefficiency of the post World War I settlements for human security. 
After World War II, the individual started to have a more central place in 
international law. Although the general view until that time was that states could not 
be held responsible for injuries they inflicted on non-citizens, and not be held 
accountable to the outside world for their affairs with their own citizens, that view 
started to change when the victors of World War II held Nazi administration 
responsible for the crimes against their own citizens as well as their crimes against 
peace and humanity at the Nuremberg trials in 1945. After World War II, the 
pressure of the Holocaust and the failure of the existing settlement until that date 
forced a new establishment among the circles which had influence in the negotiations 
to found the UN. Groups like the American Law Institute, the International Labor 
Organization, the American Jewish Committee and the American Bar Association 
lobbied for the inclusion of a bill of rights in the UN Charter.102 Although such a bill 
was not included in the Charter, some articles referred to human rights. For instance, 
according to Article 55 the UN is going to promote “universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all…” Article 56 states 
that the members are to take “joint and separate action… for the achievement” of 
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universal respect for human rights. And the Article 68 commits that a Commission 
for the purpose of promoting human rights shall be created.103  
After the foundation of the UN, a more active institutionalization of the 
human rights protection was witnessed through the treaties and agencies. The Human 
Rights Commission was formed in 1946. In 1948, the convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights were adopted. International Covenant on Civil and Political rights (ICCPR) 
was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966.104 According to the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), there are 9 core 
human rights bodies founded by treaties today, including the ICCPR. These are:  
The Human Rights Committee (CCPR) monitors implementation of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and its 
optional protocols;  
 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) 
monitors implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (1966);  
 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
monitors implementation of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965);  
 The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) monitors implementation of the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979) and its optional 
protocol (1999);  
 The Committee Against Torture (CAT) monitors implementation of the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment (1984);  
 The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) monitors 
implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) and 
its optional protocols (2000);  
The Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW) monitors implementation of 
the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990); 
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The Committee on the Right of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) 
monitors implementation of the International Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (2006); and 
 The Committee on Enforced Disappearance (CED) monitors 
implementation of the International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance (2006).105 
 
Despite this proliferation of the treaties and broad coverage on human rights, 
there remained a problem. Firstly, these treaties were only binding for those states 
which ratified them, and secondly the individuals are mainly dependent on their own 
states to defend their rights even if it is the same state which violates those rights.106 
Similarly the question was the same in terms of prevention or alleviation of the 
human suffering. What if the sovereign state ignores its responsibilities, jeopardizes 
its own citizens or is unable to act to protect them? 
During the Cold War, the US and the West were too occupied with the 
expansion of their sphere of influence against the Soviet threat. In this regard, many 
countries were given military and economic support for strategic reasons like the US 
support on Saddam Hussein. However, after the end of the cold war, things began to 
change. The end of the superpower rivalry enabled the states to focus on the 
prevention of abuse by governments.107 With the UN Charter and the international 
treaties remaining as the only legal basis to use force, some circles have been fiercely 
criticizing the prohibition on the use of force regulated by them. Among those critics 
are the scholars, NGOs, media and some Western political figures. According to 
them, the UN Charter can no longer respond to the needs of the Post-Cold War 
period.108  
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a. Wars Waged on behalf of Humanitarianism 
 
This period witnessed the first examples of the use of force for reasons other 
than self defense. The following are the cases which will also be referred to in the 
rest of this study. The cases were selected according to their general acceptability by 
the scholars. In this regard, two contentious cases, Afghanistan War in 2002 and Iraq 
War in 2003 were not included since they are not generally regarded as humanitarian 
interventions because of the controversy surrounding their rationale and their 
dubious conduct in terms of humanitarianism. 
 
(1) Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq 
 
The first case concerns the UN Security Council Resolution to create safe 
heavens in Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War and its implementation. After his defeat in 
the First Gulf War in 1991, Saddam Hussein wanted to punish Kurds and Shiites for 
their attempts to rebel and topple his regime when the Security Council Resolution 
686 was taken to establish a peace settlement.109 Although the US president George 
W. Bush Sr. had called the Iraqi people to rebel against Saddam Hussein, the West 
decided not to support the rebels due to the fact that Kurdish rebellion might 
destabilize the region, as there were also Kurds living in Turkey, Syria and Iran. 
With the inaction of the coalition forces Saddam’s Republican Guards swiftly headed 
to the north that created floods of refuges at the Turkish and Iranian borders.110  
Turkey was solid on its decision not to accept them through its borders, since such a 
large group of Kurdish people might threaten the stability in South Eastern 
Anatolia.111 Instead, the then Turkish President Turgut Özal suggested George W. 
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Bush Sr. the creation of safe heavens on the plains on the other side of the 
mountainous area between Turkey and Iraq.112 On the other hand, the region was 
being closely followed by the international media, and the scenes of refuges covering 
TV screens created public pressure on the US government to help the almost 2 
million refugees.113 With the rising public pressure, the Security Council took 
Resolution 688 which “condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in 
many parts of Iraq . . . the consequences of which threaten international peace and 
security in the region” (SC Res 688, 5 April 1991).114 Also this resolution called the 
member states and humanitarian organizations to join in the aid efforts.115 Due to the 
intensity of the public pressure, the US decided to initiate air drop campaign in the 
region and on 10 April it announced the area above 36th parallel as a no-fly zone.116 
On 16 April the US and the UK along with France decided to send ground troops to 
support the establishment of safe heavens and the distribution of humanitarian aid in 
the region. That operation came to be known as Operation Provide Comfort.117 On 
the same day, the coalition forces were announced entering the region to create six 
safe camps which later proved insufficient for the large number of refugees. Then, 
the protection area of the coalition forces were extended to cover several important 
towns, including Dohuk.118 On 18 April, the UN and the Iraqi government signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding, according to which the Iraqi military forces would 
not violate the safe zones.119 The operation expanded as to include 20.000 soldiers 
from 13 countries with the support of 30 countries within an area of 5500 square 
kilometers. US troops continued to operate in the region until July 1991 when the 
UN High Commission for Refugees took control of the camps.120 
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On the other hand, a closer analysis suggests that the permanent Western 
members of the Security Council (P-3); the US, the UK and France, employed a 
broad interpretation of the UN Resolution 688 with the passive acceptance of Russia 
and China. This led to the de facto division of Iraq into three parts with the 
introduction of no-fly zones in the Iraqi air space.121 With the Operation Provide 
Comfort Northern Iraq was forcibly separated from Baghdad administration. The 
subsequent developments, including the 2003 Iraq War, indicate that the operation 
was not performed out of pure humanitarian motives; the weakening of the military 
and political governance of Iraq by the P-3 intervention paved the way for another 
war in 2003 to depose the Saddam regime.122 Although the US-led coalition referred 
to the existence of the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq to justify their 
intervention in 2003, they quickly changed course and deployed humanitarian 
justifications when no such weapons were later found by the UN arms inspectors.123 
 
 (2) Somalia 
 
The second case is Somalia. Somalia had been living on the food aid of the 
Western countries since the 1970s. However, due to civil war in Somalia, this help 
ceased and by the end of 1992 about 400.000 people had been estimated to die due to 
starvation. 4.500.000 Somalis were in need of international aid in general. 124  The 
famine resulted in the fall of the dictatorship of Mohammed Siad Barre by an 
insurgency in January 1991. After the fall of the central authority, warlords competed 
to seize power in the country.125  On 23 January 1992, Security Council adopted 
Resolution 733 which enforced an arms embargo on Somalia under Chapter VII of 
the Charter since the conflict in Somalia was a threat to international peace and 
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security.126 On the other hand, notwithstanding the provision of the required aid to 
Somalia, deaths occurred due to the lawless distribution of aid by the local 
warlords.127 To improve the situation, the Security Council adopted Resolution 775, 
which authorized the deployment of 3500 peacekeepers to Somalia. The first party of 
these 500 peace keepers, UNOSOM I (United Nations Operation in Somalia), were 
the Pakistani soldiers who were attacked at Mogadishu airport during their mission to 
guard the UN aid provision to the country. The force could do no more than waiting 
at the airport.128 Later, the UN adopted Resolution 794 on 3 December 1992 
authorizing the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) for Somalia, also known as 
Operation Restore Hope.129  This force was authorized to use all necessary means to 
create the safe environment for the success of the relief operations. However, since 
the Security Council failed to explain the exact goals and requirements for this 
“secure environment”, the UNITAF and the later UNOSOM II missions were not an 
example of absolute success at all.130 
 
 (3) Rwanda 
 
The third case is Rwanda. The crisis and conflicts in Rwanda were not 
products of a short term as it is the case in all the examples. The conflict between 
Tutsis and Hutus dates back to the colonial times, when Belgians favored Tutsis over 
the Hutu majority due to their belief in the racial superiority of Tutsis. In 1959, Hutus 
rebelled against the Tutsis and the Belgians. 20.000 people were killed, the Tutsi 
administration was overthrown, Belgians left Rwanda and Rwanda became an 
independent state in 1961. Many Tutsis fled to Uganda in 1959 with significant 
repetitions in 1963, 1967 and 1973.131  
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Until the end of 1980s several coups were attempted by both the remaining 
Tutsis and Hutus to capture power. The refugees in Rwanda founded the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) which helped Yoweri Museveni to overthrow the government. 
In return they secured material help. The aim of the RPF was to protect the Tutsi 
refugees in Uganda and capture power in Rwanda. RPF invaded Northern Rwanda 
with the help of Uganda on 1 October 1990.132 In the beginning of the civil war 
between Rwandan Government and the RPF, Government had been weakened by the 
economic problems and deteriorating social problems. The military successes of the 
RPF gave it more power to negotiate with the government. This in turn aggravated 
the whole situation, since the RPF’s gaining more power meant the empowerment of 
the demands of Tutsis and the less likelihood of agreement between the warring 
parties.133  
The RPF’s first aim was to force the government to agree to some reforms in 
Rwanda and a new power sharing government constituted by two societies. In 
February 1991, the Rwandan Government accepted to negotiate with the RPF and 
Dar Es Salaam Declaration was signed. Reform requests of the RPF and international 
pressures resulted in a coalition government of various groups in April 1991. This 
peace was interrupted by the killing of 300 Tutsis and the following violence in 
February 1992. The UN Security Council was requested to send a mission to the 
Ugandan side of Uganda – Rwanda border to monitor the RPF and Ugandan Army. 
On 22 June 1993, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 846 and launched the 
United Nations Observer Mission Uganda–Rwanda (UNOMUR).134  
After long negotiations, Arusha Accords were signed on 4 August 1993. 
According to this agreement, a democratically elected, broadly representative 
government was to be established. The army and governmental posts would be 
occupied by the Tutsis and Hutus together. An international force was also requested 
to police the working of the agreement and also to keep security of Kigali where the 
mass killings of many Tutsis had taken place in February 1992 events. On 5 October 
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1993, the UN Security Council Resolution 872 was adopted to establish the United 
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). 
On 6 April 1994, President Habyarimana and the President of Burundi, 
Cyprien Ntaryamira were killed by a missile attack on the plane at Kigali airport. 
Upon the murder, a planned massacre of moderate Hutus and Tutsis began. Many 
governmental figures from Tutsi origins were killed along with Belgian peacekeepers 
to force Belgium withdraw its support from UNAMIR as it was the largest 
contributor. In response the RPF forces mobilized and fought successfully against the 
Rwandan Army. In two months they gained control most of the country. During the 
killings UNAMIR could not be effective due to the small numbers of peacekeepers. 
The reaction of the UN Security Council was to reduce the number of the 
peacekeepers by Resolution 912 on 21 April to protect its own personnel. The 
remaining staff would monitor the events and would act as mediators between the 
parties. However, despite being late, the Security Council adopted Resolution 918 on 
17 May, upon acknowledgement of the suffering of the non-combatants, to 
strengthen UNAMIR (UNAMIR II) with a number of 5000 peacekeepers. But, the 
genocide could not be prevented and forces were deployed to Rwanda too late.  
Due to the deployment problems, France requested authorization to intervene 
unilaterally, and Resolution 929 was adopted on 22 June 1994. The French operation, 
known as Operation Turquoise began on the same day. The French troops evacuated 
the camps where remaining Tutsi refugees were dwelling and would be killed by the 
Rwandan Army. However, the problem with the evacuation was that French force 
also moved extremist Hutus with their equipment and arms to Zaire, Uganda and 
Burundi while rescuing the Tutsis.135 The UN missions and operations are always 
remembered as great failures for humanitarian intervention. Maybe the greatest 
among those is the response of the Security Council to the call of Canadian Major-
General Romeo Dallaire, the commander of UNAMIR, to strengthen UNAMIR to 
defend non-combatants from the expected massacre, about which he had also warned 
the UN in his reports. The Security Council responded to this call by reducing the 
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number of the peacekeepers.136 The calculated number of deaths, which occurred, is 
between 50.000 and 100.000 depending on the method for calculation. And there 
were rapes between 250.000 and 500.000.137 Rwanda has now come to constitute a 
ground for anti-interventionists who criticized the intervention on the grounds of 
inaction, inefficient action, and wrong conduct as well as wrong motives.  
 
(4) Bosnia 
 
The fourth case is Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yugoslavia, which was founded after 
the First World War, was consisting of many nationalities. During the Second World 
War, the territory of Yugoslav Kingdom was occupied by Germany, Italy, Hungary 
and Bulgaria and Yugoslav people fought successfully against the Axis invasion. 
After the Second World War, Josip Broz tito established his rule which lasted until 
the 1980’s..During Tito’s administration different nationalities could live peacefully 
in six autonomous republics and two autonomous regions of Serbia, and Kosovo and 
Vojvodina. However, with his death, problems among different nationalities arose.138 
After Tito, Slobodan Milosevic emerged as the new major political figure and he was 
elected as the president of The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia through the first 
democratic election in December 1990.139  
Joseph Tito had been an important figure to settle the problems and forge a 
new Yugoslav national identity among people until his death. After his death in 
1981, it was the ethno-nationalist policies and discourses of Slobodan Milosevic, 
Radovan Karadzic and Franjo Tudjman which deteriorated the situation for people of 
old Yugoslavia.140 
The crisis for Yugoslavia began with the Croatian and Slovenian declarations 
of independence on 25 June 1991. Fighting immediately began between Yugoslav 
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National Army (JNA) and Slovenian Army which defeated the former shortly after. 
Then the fight between JNA combined with Serb militia and Croatian forces began. 
The second war took relatively longer than the Slovenian fight and lasted with 
declared and broken ceasefires.141 In reaction to this fight, the UN Security Council 
adopted Resolution 713 for an arms embargo on Yugoslavia on 25 September 
1991.142 However, the embargo had no effect and fighting went on. The breakup of 
Yugoslavian unity created an insecure environment for Bosnia, where Muslims, 
Serbs and Croats lived together. Thus it was the breakup of the federation which 
entailed the Bosnian declaration of independence.143 Fearing a violent reaction of the 
Serbs and JNA, Bosnia-Herzegovina administration waited until 1 March 1992, 
when a referendum was held. On 3 March 1992, Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic 
declared independence. Slovenia and Crotia were recognized by the European 
Community on 15 January 1992 and Bosnia-Herzegovina on 7 April 1992. The US 
recognized three countries on 7 April 1992 and the UN General Assembly granted 
membership to them on 22 May 1992.144 
The war in Bosnia began on 5 April when Serb snipers shot the demonstrators 
who condemned the radicalization between Serb and Muslim groups in the country 
and demanded the deployment of international peacekeepers in order to prevent the 
war. The conflict quickly spread over the country.145 By the end of 1992, the JNA 
had ethnically cleansed many parts of the country through mass killings and forceful 
deportations.146 The establishment of an international protectorate would require the 
Security Council Resolution which was not sure due to the possibility of a Russian 
veto. Moscow might see the intervention as an attempt to extend Western influence 
on the Balkans. On the other hand, Bush administration was solid that no American 
ground forces would be deployed in such a mission with the bitter experience of 
losses in Somalia.147  
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The revelation of Serb detention camps in Bosnia marked a turning point in 
international reaction to Bosnia. The pressure of the countries, especially of the 
Muslims was regarded to have caused the belated UN action. The UN Security 
Council Resolution 770 was adopted on 13 August 1992. According to the 
Resolution, member states were authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter “to use 
all necessary means to deliver humanitarian aid to the civilians of Bosnia”. This 
action was welcomed by the Bosnian government and in this regard, it was not an 
action against the will of the sovereign.148  This resolution was followed by further 
engagement of the Security Council.149 However, the willingness of the UN Security 
Council members were not as sound as expected. For instance, the British and French 
governments confined the participation of their soldiers to the peace keeping mission 
in terms of UNPROFOR II. However, the humanitarian aid procured to Bosnian 
people during the winter of 1992-1993 was of great help to keep suffering people 
alive.150 
From 1991 to 1998 a total of eighty three resolutions were adopted by the 
Security Council. These also included the deployment of a UN Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) to undertake a series of actions in Bosnia beginning in April 1992. 
Until 1995, this force commenced operations including peacekeeping, aid provision 
and preparing necessary conditions for a peace settlement. However, during its term 
of mission UNPROFOR was blamed for its inaction against the Serbian military 
gains violating the international law and its human rights violations. 151 The war in 
Bosnia between Serbs, Bosnians and Croats lasted until the Dayton Accords in 
November 1995.152  
The severe conflicts continued without remarkable intervention of the West. 
However, NATO had authorized the NATO and UNPROFOR commanders to use 
NATO air force to bomb targets when required to defend the safe areas where 
refugees dwelt as well as the UN and NATO personnel.153 After the NATO bombing 
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campaign began, although it was highly criticized in the aftermath, Croatian and 
Bosnian forces had significant success against Bosnian Serbs. War in Bosnia ended 
in October 1995 and a peace agreement was signed in Dayton on 21 November 
1995.154 Dayton Agreement defined the allocation of Bosnian soil among the subject 
societies and the settlement on the administration.155 However, Dayton itself had 
problems in the application phase.156   
With the Bosnian conflict, the NATO assumed a new duty to intervene in 
humanitarian crises in addition to its existing duties against the member states.157 
Although the initiation of the NATO action was based on the UN Resolution 770 
taken under Chapter VII, the problem of the NATO air campaign was that the NATO 
expanded the campaign unilaterally without obtaining a further resolution. This 
action turned the NATO’s role from a support mission into a full scale 
belligerence.158 The failure to act on time showed the importance of preventive 
action in humanitarian crises rather than acting after the unfolding of ethnic 
cleansing.159 
 
(5) Kosovo 
 
The next case is Kosovo. Although the roots of crisis lay in the history of the 
Balkans as it was in Bosnia, the turning point was Milosevic’s repeal of Kosovo’s 
autonomy in 1989 which had been established by Joseph Tito. From 1990 to 1995 
Kosovo Albanians remained in peace and maintained their own rule in a number of 
spheres from taxing to education while Serb minority adhered to Belgrade.160 In 
1995, the absence of any provisions for Kosovo in the Dayton Accords came as a 
shock for Kosovo Albanians. This also signaled the end of the time for Ibrahim 
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Rugova and the Democratic League of Kosovo which had till then followed a pacifist 
policy. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) took up arms and initiated attacks on 
the Serbian police and military of the FRY. Their aim was to generate domestic 
support for their cause against FRY, but more importantly to invoke international 
reaction and intervention into Kosovo.161 
As KLA predicted, FRY and Serbian forces responded with force and 
violence. The fight went on with the escalation of political violence in 1997. 
Although Serbian forces were much superior to the KLA, the later could gain some 
success in controlling some regions like Drenica region. However, Serbs were 
determined to exterminate the KLA and initiated the extermination operation which 
transformed the street wars into a full-scale war in February 1998.162 
Although many international observers and fact-finding groups working on 
Balkans and FRY had warned that Kosovo was a ticking bomb ready to explode, 
there had been little effort by the international community to take the necessary 
measures.163 It was the mid-1998 when the international society realized the 
emergency in Kosovo by the numbers of refugees and internally displaced 
persons.164 In October 1998, a settlement was negotiated but it failed since Richard 
Holbrooke, the chief US negotiator, gave personal guarantee that KLA would abide 
by the agreement. However, KLA did not act according to the agreement and 
violence increased. On 15 January 1999, Serb army moved into Racak where media 
shot pictures of corpses belonging to 45 Albanian civilians later. This provoked deep 
anti-Milosevic view within international opinion.165 
After this point, the credibility of the West as well as the issue of 
humanitarianism came under increasing scrutiny. At the end of January, the Contact 
Group (the US, UK, France, Russia, Germany and Italy) which also served during 
Bosnian War, called all parties to Rambouillet, France on 6 February to negotiate 
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peace. And the NATO threatened to use force against the parties who would not 
comply with its call. The Rambouillet negotiations broke down when FRY 
representatives rejected to reach an agreement.166  
On 24 March 1999, NATO began its bombing campaign (Operation Allied 
Force) against Serbian targets. As in Bosnian war, this bombing operation was also 
highly criticized in the aftermath. The bombing campaign lasted for 11 weeks, 
causing much Serbian reaction with thousands of deaths and refugees. The war could 
only come to an end with the Technical Military Agreement signed on 9 June 1999 
between the FRY and NATO after the G-8 states had agreed on the text of the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1244. According to this resolution and the report of the 
Secretary-General of 12 June (S/1999/672), the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) 
was established and deployed in the region. The Albanian population continued to 
insist on independence and declared it on 17 February 2008.167 NATO intervention in 
Kosovo crisis is a turning point in the use of force. The use of force in Kosovo was 
not one of self-defense. Although, it was defended under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, the operation was a direct violation of a state’s sovereignty and the 
territorial integrity of the state, with the de facto autonomy granted to Kosovo which 
culminated in its independence.168 After Kosovo intervention of NATO, a new 
debate has begun whether this intervention constituted a precedent for future 
violations of sovereignty for the sake of human rights. After the intervention, 
Independent International Commission for Kosovo found NATO intervention illegal 
for lacking the necessary UN Security Council mandate, but stated its legitimacy, 
since the ongoing humanitarian urgency required the intervention.169 
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(6) Darfur 
 
The last case is Darfur. Sudan’s borders were defined by the British colonial 
government between 1899 and 1956. These borders were not drawn with regard to 
any population structure or geographical feature of the country. After independence 
in 1956, a civil war broke out in 1967 between the Islamic Northern Sudan and 
Christian Southern Sudan. The war took about 2 million lives but world ignored it.170 
There are two primary groups in Sudan; the first one is the Africans who 
dwell on agriculture. The second one is the Arabs who are semi-nomadic people 
living on their livestock. The conflict has mainly been between the Arabs and the 
Africans. The recent crisis in Darfur dates back to 1970s when the Sudanese 
Government disturbed the system which had settled the disputes among tribes on 
food, water and land. The erosion of the dispute settlement mechanism caused 
inefficiency in preventing and mediating conflicts of the Sudanese administration 
such as in Darfur. Since people of Darfur felt themselves insecure and 
disenfranchised from the national political system, they formed their own village 
defenses and in 2001 the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM) were formed from these militias.171 
In 2003, the SLA and JEM launched attacks on the government military 
posts. The fight between the government and the rebels got tougher when the 
Janjaweed militia was introduced into the conflict. The counter-insurgency resulted 
in 30.000 deaths in April 2004 and there was no agreement. After a long period of 16 
months of inaction after the conflict began, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
1547 on 11 June 2004 which called the parties to use their influence to bring an 
immediate halt to the fighting in the Darfur region. Resolution 1556 was adopted on 
30 July 2004 recognizing the territorial integrity of Sudan. It called the Sudanese 
government to protect its civilians against the Janjaweed. The Security Council 
threatened the Sudanese government with using force if it did not disarm the 
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Janjaweed in a month. However, the fact was that the government was working with 
the Janjaweed. 172  
Following an international debate whether to act or not, the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 1564 in September 2004, which recognized the non-compliance 
of the Sudanese government with the Resolution 1556. In January 2005, International 
Commission of Enquiry on Darfur (IECD) published its report which found the 
Sudanese government and Janjaweed to be responsible for the violations of human 
rights. In 2005, five resolutions were adopted; however, they did not prescribe 
punitive action. In March 2005, Resolution 1593 assigned the situation to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). In August 2006, the UN Security Council 
authorized the deployment of 17.300 troops and 3300 civilian police to Darfur 
through the Resolution 1706 upon Sudanese Government’s consent. 173  
On 31 July 2007, Resolution 1769 was adopted by the Security Council under 
Chapter VII which authorized the foundation of African Union (AU)/UN Hybrid 
operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The core mandate of UNAMID was the protection 
of the civilians, assisting for humanitarian aid, monitoring and verifying 
implementation of agreements, contribution for a political process to include all 
groups, working to promote human rights and rule of law and monitoring the border 
situation of Sudan with Chad and the Central African Republic.174 The UNAMID 
lacking the necessary support and resources from the powerful countries failed to be 
effective and in 2008 the killings and rapes were reported to be continuing by the UN 
special reporter on Sudan.175 Today the UN estimates that about 4.7 million 
Sudanese people have been deeply affected by the Darfur Crisis.176 The Darfur Crisis 
is still on the top of the intervention debate as it is seen as the solid proof for the 
hazard of non-intervention and inaction. 
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b. The Responsibility to Protect: A New Era? 
 
The Responsibility to Protect is the most recent pro-intervention approach. In 
this chapter, following the definition of humanitarian intervention, the basics of the 
interventionist idea were presented. And then the principles of non-intervention and 
the immunity of state sovereignty were reviewed from a historical perspective. Later 
on, the violation of sovereignty was illustrated through cases from the 19th and 20th 
centuries. This was followed by a brief account of the legalization process of the 
state sovereignty in the international system. And it was seen that several 
interventions in the 20th century were undertaken with the pretext of self-defense 
during and after the Cold War, except for Kosovo. The atrocities that shocked the 
international community in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, although they were 
justified under Chapter VII or claimed to be so, led the interveners to found ad hoc 
tribunals to try those who were responsible for the crimes against humanity. This was 
a direct intervention to the realm of the externally invulnerable state sovereignty.177  
The increase in the humanitarian emergencies caused a need to expand and empower 
the doctrine for intervention by transcending the obstruction of the state 
sovereignty.178 
…if  humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to 
gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept 
of our common humanity? Kofi Annan179 
 
At the turn of the millennium, the debate started to change its form. The 
existing debate was turning into that between the pluralists of the existing debate and 
the solidarists who were developing a preemptive interventionism. Then the 
interventionist bloc had to answer and elaborate on two questions; ‘Whether to 
intervene?’ and if yes, then ‘how the humanitarian disasters can be prevented?’ 
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In September 2000, the Government of Canada announced that it established 
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The 
aim of the ICISS was to find answers to the legal, moral, operational and political 
questions of humanitarian intervention. In this effort, the ICISS published the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in December 2001.180 
The report was prepared as a reaction to the inefficiency of the existing UN 
system vis-à-vis the violations of basic human rights and human security. The UN 
system was founded to maintain peace and security in the international system. 
However, the events which destroy peace and create the insecure conditions are 
increasingly of intra-state rather than of interstate origin.181 Along with the 
internationalization of the internal affairs of the state, the other debate has been that 
the UN Charter is originally paradoxical as it both aims to maintain international 
peace by protecting state sovereignty and the human rights. Then a new approach 
had to be found. The R2P suggests that sovereignty defined as “supreme authority 
within a territory”, 182 brings about a responsibility entailing that being sovereign is 
not being immune to the international reactions and free from responsibilities against 
its own citizens. Such a responsibility is threefold. Firstly, the state authorities are 
responsible for the security and well-being of their citizens. Secondly, the state 
authorities are responsible to their citizens and also international community through 
the UN. And thirdly, the authorities are held responsible for their actions and 
omissions while ruling.183 
 According to the report, the responsibility to protect consists of three 
elements. The first element is the responsibility to prevent, i.e. preventing 
humanitarian crises before their eruption by monitoring the situation of problematic 
regions and acting with the necessary non-military and/or military means.184 The 
second element, the responsibility to react envisions that all states as well as the host 
state are responsible to react against the humanitarian disasters. And the evaluation 
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of a conflict as a disaster is to be made on the basis of the defined thresholds.185 The 
third element is that, if any military intervention takes place, all states have the 
responsibility to rebuild in the sense that the conditions of public safety and order 
will be reconstituted.186 No matter which of these elements is at issue, the important 
point was that there has been an outcry for the existing legal discourse; every state is 
responsible for the security of its own citizens; and if they are unable or unwilling to 
provide for their safety, then the duty will be born by the international society.187 
The aim in preparation of the report was the establishment a new norm and a 
set of rules for humanitarian intervention, which all the states were expected to 
comply with.188 The ICISS defined these rules as the six ‘Principles for Military 
Intervention’. These principles are based on those that are associated with the Just 
War tradition back in history: right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, 
proportional means and reasonable prospects.189 Since those criteria were elaborated 
above, they will not be repeated here.  
The Responsibility to Protect was on the agenda of the 2005 U.N. World 
Summit in New York on 14-16 September 2005. Although it is hard to know how 
much effect the continuing US-led invasion of Iraq had on the topic, R2P took place 
in the Outcome Document to some extent.190 
As paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Outcome Document state: 
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, 
including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. 
We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The 
international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help 
States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in 
establishing an early warning capability. 
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The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, 
to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take 
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security 
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a 
case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional 
organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and 
national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity…191 
 
 
The provisions of the World Summit were repeated in the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1674 on 28 April 2006 to protect the civilians and Resolution 
1796 on 31 August 2006 which appealed to the members for the deployment of a UN 
peacekeeping force in Darfur.192 
 
However, the R2P as accepted in the World Summit is much ‘lighter’ when 
considered as a definition of a doctrine or as the criteria to be followed. In fact, the 
outcome document only accepts the existence of such a responsibility without 
defining any principles or rules to follow. At this point the international society, 
including the governments, NGOs and other groups, is divided. One group is 
satisfied that the R2P was mentioned and accepted as a reality and it will have further 
prominence and develop gradually as signifying the international law’s evolution vis-
a-vis the individual rights. On the other hand, the other group is not content with 
such a limited inclusion without the inclusion of principles of using force and any 
provisions for states.193  
The R2P has been a breakthrough, since its initial announcement. Many 
expectations were based on it as well as many criticisms were targeted at it. 
Currently the debate is still going on about its legality, legitimacy and efficiency as a 
novelty on the subject. 
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SECOND CHAPTER  
 
MORALITY, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION 
 
The previous chapter elaborated on the meaning, historical and legal 
evolution of the humanitarian intervention, including the Just War tradition.  
This chapter will present the current views and debates on the issues of 
legality, legitimacy and morality of the intervention. Since such an effort to expose 
all the problems in the respected realms might be exhausting and time-consuming, 
only major problems will be focused upon by means of cases reviewed in the 
previous chapter. Although this chapter will handle each problem separately, it 
should be noted that those issues are actually intermingled. For instance, when 
legitimacy is at issue, legality problem cannot be excluded, or when morality is at 
issue legitimacy is also involved. 
 
I. WHAT MAKES A LEGITIMATE INTERVENTION? 
 
Humanitarian intervention has become a controversial topic concerning 
almost all its aspects, from definition to implementation. The issue of definition and 
the debates on it were reviewed in the previous chapter.   
This part will go through the conditions of a legitimate humanitarian 
intervention as cited in the literature with a view to finding out the common points 
regarded as the criteria for a legitimate intervention.  
The present day criteria are mainly based on the Just War criteria, which have 
their origins in Thomas Aquinas’ writings. With the proliferation of humanitarian 
emergencies and international efforts to alleviate the human suffering in the post-
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Cold War era, a new search began to legitimize interventions and to avoid the 
argument that states abuse humanitarianism for their national interests.194  
However, there is also a counter-view even on this effort. Alex J. Bellamy 
states that since decisions on the criteria and justifications to intervene will be 
political and pragmatic due to the competition among states, the effort is futile. Only 
righteousness may be found in the outcomes in terms of pragmatic view.195 Even 
though such criteria were to be accepted, there is no guarantee that states would 
agree concerning their fulfillment.196 
Another view questions the blind adherence of states to the criteria for 
humanitarian intervention if they were to come into being. 197 For instance, if states 
are to follow all the criteria as a rule, that would bring no good. Suppose that there is 
a humanitarian emergency in a state where the government concerned holds 
systematic massacre or forceful displacement of ethnic minority. However, according 
the criteria of Just War, states which are able to intervene should wait for the 
exhaustion of non-military means to halt the emergency. If states strictly follow the 
criteria, they should wait to deploy military means as a last resort, no matter how 
many people are killed during the procedure. The critical view suggests that states 
should be able to reverse the ordering of the Just War criteria, or even eliminate the 
criterion of last resort when necessary.  
As stated in the previous chapter, there are two sorts of criteria to wage a 
legitimate humanitarian war. These are two categories based on the historical 
evolution of the Just War tradition: jus ad bellum (to wage a just war) and jus in 
bellum (to conduct a just war).198 They involve right (legitimate) authority, just 
cause, right intention, last resort, proportionality and reasonable hope. 
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Although each of these criteria is deemed crucial in the literature, there is the 
prerequisite that there must be an event which urges states to intervene and prompts 
the international community to apply them. That event should be of the kind which 
“shocks the moral conscience of mankind”.199 This shocking event does require an 
audience to be perceived as ‘shocking’ and the reaction to it leads to the 
intervention.200 Then what is this shocking event?  
Nicholas Wheeler defines this shocking event as the just cause to wage 
war.201 Accordingly, no state can claim to have a right or duty to intervene unless 
there is an exceptional humanitarian emergency. However, there is not a specific 
definition of this shock. In Wheeler’s view, although some claim that the number of 
deaths or displaced people might be a valid indicator for the existence of such a just 
cause to intervene, he states that endorsing such a threshold would be arbitrary. 
Instead, he defines this supreme humanitarian emergency as the situation in which 
the human suffering cannot be stopped without the intervention of a foreign state or 
group of states.202 Michael Walzer also defines the aim of the humanitarian 
intervention as to stop the actions that “shock the conscience of humankind”.203 
Although, the threshold cannot be exactly known or defined, this humanitarian 
urgency is something different than the claims of general human rights violations. In 
other words, violations of the right to free speech and of the right to live do not 
constitute similar emergencies. From a utilitarian perspective, as Heinze argues, one 
cannot exercise his right to free speech when he is dead.204 
The number of cases which became subject to the debate of humanitarian 
intervention has increased since the end of the Cold War and it is expected to rise 
further. The detection of a humanitarian emergency, though not properly defined, can 
be used to distinguish and limit the number of the cases to be intervened. Heinze uses 
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utilitarian reasoning to define such situations. He refers to large scale, imminent or 
ongoing, and deliberately perpetrated deprivations of basic human goods as 
situations for which humanitarian intervention is morally permissible.205 
According to this view, the basic human goods refer to the basic rights, such 
as the right to life, the right to physical integrity, the right to food and shelter, and the 
right not to be tortured, without which other human rights cannot be protected as 
stated above.206 Secondly, there must be a large scale violation of those basic rights. 
However, measuring this scale is also problematic. If a threshold is to be set, the only 
solid and analytical way may be to count the death. However, such an approach is 
seen as immoral and inhumane, because this may lead to intentional non-intervention 
to let some killing happen so as to justify a military intervention later on.207 Then this 
situation must be an emergency which can be halted only by way of intervention 
from the outside. 
 Thirdly, the violation must be deliberate as part of a sinister plan to destroy 
an opposition group.208  
And lastly, in order to defend the legitimacy of an intervention, there must be 
an ongoing violation or a recent one since the first duty of the intervention is to halt 
atrocities. The past violations, which happened before but has no more effect on the 
human conscience other than a rueful memory of a humanitarian disaster cannot be 
claimed as a just cause to resort to war.209  
The Responsibility to Protect doctrine, which has become the latest norm on 
humanitarian intervention accepts an amalgamation of all of the criteria that have 
been referred to in this study so far.210 On 2 December 2004, the Secretary-General’s 
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change following the ICISS report on 
the issue accepted the following as the criteria to be followed in case of a decision to 
intervene: 
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Seriousness of threat.  Is the threatened harm to State or human security 
of a kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify prima facie the use 
of military force?  In the case of internal threats, does it involve genocide 
and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of 
international humanitarian law, actual or imminently apprehended?  
Proper purpose.  Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed 
military action is to halt or avert the threat in question, whatever other 
purposes or motives may be involved?  
Last resort.  Has every non-military option for meeting the threat in 
question been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing that other 
measures will not succeed?  
Proportional means.  Are the scale, duration and intensity of the 
proposed military action the minimum necessary to meet the threat in 
question?  
Balance of consequences.  Is there a reasonable chance of the military 
action being successful in meeting the threat in question, with the 
consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of 
inaction?211 
 
Having put forward the assumed criteria for a legitimate humanitarian 
intervention as above, the following part shall seek to explain the major problems 
associated with them. 
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II. CONFLICTING ISSUES OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: 
LEGITIMACY AND MORALITY 
 
Morality has been increasingly emphasized since the end of the Cold War, 
while the analysis in International Relations moved away from the domain of 
Realpolitik to that of the so-called normative theory.212 Morality of humanitarian 
intervention is intertwined both with the legality and legitimacy of using force. As 
Eric A. Heinze states, the moral side of the humanitarian intervention, which is also 
in close relation with the natural law and moral justice, has been always in conflict 
with the legal side of the topic.213 On the other hand, morality is very closely related 
with legitimacy so that it is almost impossible to separate one from the other. 
In this section of the chapter, certain issues will be handled within the context 
of morality. These topics, as may be predicted, are the most problematic issues of 
humanitarian intervention: motives-outcomes debate; proportionality problem; non-
intervention or limited intervention not to risk the lives of soldiers, and moral effects 
of humanitarian intervention. 
 
A. Guessing the Motives or Being Satisfied with the Outcomes? 
 
It is difficult to separate the debates on the legitimacy and morality of 
humanitarian intervention. One point is that actually both of these topics rest on the 
Just War tradition and its threshold criteria, including the fundamental criterion of 
the just cause.214   
According to David Chandler, moral claims uttered for a cause help to 
legitimize the move, let’s say an intervention, much more than pure institutional 
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attempts to codify and internalize it in the international society.215 He further argues 
that the moral validity “norm” or “tradition” is actually the product of the rejection of 
existing Left or Right state politics in a purely individual focused fashion.216 Thus, 
moral aspirations associated with humanitarian intervention cause as much 
controversy as its definition and legitimacy.  
Noam Chomsky depicts this controversy in his essay ‘Humanitarian 
Imperialism: The New Doctrine of Imperial Right’, through a critical view on the 
historical record.217 He states that there are two views on norm-building, which 
conflict with each other. The first one asserts that although a state may have a record 
of interest-based action disguised under humanitarian intervention, this does not 
necessarily prove that that state will never act out of humanitarian concerns in the 
future.218  
However, according to the other view, to which Chomsky adheres, the 
institution, which makes new norms, is the one which abused the human rights 
violations or ignored them in the Cold War period. For instance, it was the same 
West which ignored human rights violations in the countries where the responsible 
administrations were deemed strategically important for the Western interests. Due to 
the existence of the path dependency within the institutions, Chomsky implies that 
states are not fully trustable in their naive moral drive for humanitarian intervention, 
at least for the action against violations or ignorance of them.219   
Chomsky is supported by Mohammed Ayoob in his doubts of pure 
humanitarian motives of the intervening states. Ayoob claims that in cases where 
there is not a firm UN Security Council authorization and when the institutions with 
dubious authority, like the NATO, act, the emerging selectivity problem casts light 
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on the more strategic and interest-based motives of the interveners as happened in 
Kosovo.220 
In this regard, David Chandler states that the critics of humanitarian 
intervention questioning the moral aspirations behind the intervention argue that 
these aspirations are mere pretexts for war. He adds that the moral reason behind the 
intervention is actually the solution against the political impediment before using 
force other than self-defense.221  
One of the main criticisms on the moral claims for the justness of the 
humanitarian intervention lies in the fact that Western powers might abuse universal 
moral values to violate the existing international law. For instance Slavoj Zizek 
asserts that when morality is not enough to outweigh law, the West produces fait 
accompli policies which violate the international law as happened in Afghanistan.222 
In a similar vein, on another path, Ken Booth also criticizes the hypocrisy of the 
great powers. He states that governments recognize the boundaries of laws when 
obeying them conforms to their interests. If not, they ignore or violate them with 
pretexts.223 
Afghanistan and Kosovo constitute both a similarity and a stark contrast in 
the acceptance of intervention as a violation of state sovereignty. They are both 
violations of the international legal principle of non-intervention. However, resorting 
to force was initially based on different premises in two situations. Afghanistan was 
not considered as a case of humanitarian intervention in the previous chapter. 
However, it is being used as an example to show the difference for the reception of 
the moral assertion by the international community. In Afghanistan case, the original 
motive was self-defense and retaliation. It was the security of the US which was at 
stake. Upon the 9/11 attacks the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 
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1368 on 12 September 2001. Shortly, it stressed that every organization, government, 
nation and person related to the attacks would be held responsible for the crime, as 
George W. Bush also stated in his own public statement after the attacks.224  
On October 7, the US informed the UN that it would initiate operation in 
Afghanistan in order to end the Al-Qaeda activities and Taliban existence in the 
country.225 The US operation, “Operation Enduring Freedom”, was originally 
depicted as an act of self-defense in the form of a pre-emptive war.  
Nonetheless, the US also used the humanitarian discourse as it is seen in the 
letter submitted by Washington to the UN Security Council: “…In addition, the 
United States will continue its humanitarian efforts to alleviate the suffering of the 
people of Afghanistan.” There were two major reasons for the US administration’s 
use of humanitarian discourse: to induce the Afghan people to give support to its 
operation against Taliban and to create a common motive to keep united the coalition 
forces who would fight beside the US in Afghanistan.226 However, there were two 
points which were widely criticized following the operation. The first one was that 
the US food aid distributed from the air was not sufficient in quantity and quality. 
The aid was claimed to be a mere “window dressing”. Secondly, the conduct of the 
operations was also criticized. There was collateral damage inflicted on the civilian 
targets such as schools, hospitals and even camps of the international relief 
organizations. This led to the questioning of the operation’s humanitarian side.227 
The use of humanitarian discourse in order to forge an alliance for the US pre-
emptive war, which was an act based on self-interest, and to raise Afghan public 
support for the Allied invasion increased the doubt of moral abuse within the 
international community. 
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After long years of war and deaths, the current situation in Afghanistan is still 
uncertain.228 The coalition forces could not achieve their target to eliminate the 
Taliban regime,229 despite inflicting heavy injuries on it. However, the latest signs 
are that Taliban is inclined to reach an agreement to end the war in Afghanistan and 
to depart with Al-Qaida.230 Nonetheless, the situation is still uncertain and the fight 
may continue even if the Taliban departs with Al-Qaida, as Al-Qaida continues to 
exist in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s adjacent regions. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Kosovo case can also be considered as 
an intervention against state sovereignty. Shortly, after the Dayton Agreement and 
the settlement of Bosnian independence along with that of the Slovenians and the 
Croatians, Kosovo Albanians had also expectation of autonomy, at least. However, 
no commitments or settlement were made for the subject. The KLA took up arms 
against Serbian police and militia in order to provoke Serbian retaliation on Kosovo. 
As the Serbian police and militia inflicted harsh blows on the KLA, and initiated a 
substantive operation into Kosovo, intentionally targeting the civilians, the NATO 
warned Belgrade administration to stop violence and attend the Rambouillet Talks. 
However, as Serbs left the table and carried on genocidal actions, the NATO initiated 
an air campaign which would last for about 78 days. After that, Serbia accepted to 
sign The Rambouillet Agreement. During the air campaign NATO also hit many 
civilian targets, causing significant collateral damage from the air.231  
Although there are similar elements in these two cases like the violation of 
another state’s sovereignty, hitting civilian targets and deployment of humanitarian 
discourse, the debate on Kosovo intervention of the NATO focused on different 
factors. In contrast to the war in Afghanistan, the main theme of debates after 
Kosovo was not morality, but legality versus legitimacy. After Kosovo intervention, 
the Independent International Commission on Kosovo initiated a substantive review 
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of the intervention and the outbreak of the conflict. The commission criticized both 
the diplomacy prior to the intervention and the methods of intervention. However, 
the commission found the NATO’s intervention illegal for violating the UN Charter, 
but legitimate with regard to the motives of the interveners, and called for state 
action to close the gap between the legitimacy and the legality of humanitarian 
intervention.232 It should be noted that the FRY applied to the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) asserting that the NATO intervention into its territory was illegal on the 
grounds that there was no authoritative Security Council resolution and that the 
NATO attacks caused many civilian deaths, which had to be considered as genocide. 
However, the ICJ rejected the FRY’s bid due to “provisional measures” by 12 to 4 
votes and added that it would decide on later whether the ICJ has jurisdiction on the 
issue or not.233 
This comparison between the two cases show that if it is predominantly 
believed (although there are also opposite views) that the primary motives of the 
actors are just and humanitarian, interventions are not regarded as moral abuse of 
humanitarianism. 
However, according to another view as represented by Alex J. Bellamy such a 
deduction solely depending on the motives to judge the morality aspect is not 
plausible. Bellamy depicts three problems associated with the issue of motive-
oriented action.  
Firstly, humanitarian intervention does not fit into the realist understanding 
that states should not risk their own citizens in order to save strangers.234  
Secondly, motives can be abused by the state leaders in order to justify their 
military aggression.235 A crucial example is provided by E. A. Heinze in his article 
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“Maximizing Human Security: A Utilitarian Argument for Humanitarian 
Intervention”. In that article, Heinze refers to the allied invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
Following their failure to find the weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the US-led 
alliance shifted their discourse and described themselves as the rescuers of Iraqi 
people from the sufferings caused by Saddam regime. Thus, the main reason to 
topple the Saddam regime was later on claimed to be humanitarianism, although the 
original motive was self-defense via a pre-emptive war. At the time of intervention, 
despite the ongoing authoritarianism of Saddam’s rule, there was not a gross and 
imminent violation of human security.236 Thirdly, according to Bellamy, focusing on 
motives may cause negligence on the possible outcomes of an intervention.237  
The question raised by those who prioritize outcomes of the action over 
motives is “Does the motive of a military action matter when it brings about 
humanitarian good?”238 In terms of the motives versus outcomes debate, the point is 
that sole motive- or sole outcome-oriented approach has problems of its own. The 
good motives may not always result in human goods. And humanitarian good may 
not always be generated out of good motives. A state may conduct illegal, bad or 
inhuman acts towards a community, which bring about human good. States may 
attempt to cover their inhumane conducts and abusive motives through the 
unintentionally obtained humanitarian good. In this regard, Heinze criticizes the sole 
dependence on outcomes as a legitimizing factor of intervention. In the previous 
chapter, the case of Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia was given as an early case 
of humanitarian intervention whose outcome led to the change of Pol Pot regime and 
freed Cambodian citizens from its tyranny, as referred by Wheeler.239 Heinze states 
that allowing states to act with the confidence of consequent regime change would 
allow partisan, warmonger behavior to topple the enemy regime.240 The solution for 
the question of motives-outcomes debate might be to employ the ‘doctrine of double 
effect’ of Thomas Aquinas. According to that, as explained in the previous chapter, 
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good motives should lead to good results and good outcomes should follow good 
motives.241 
The difference between the intentionally achieved good and accidentally 
achieved good must be distinguished. However, such a separation requires concrete 
evidence in order to test the consequence of the behavior. Such data cannot be 
observed explicitly. It might be derived through discourse analysis of leaders’ 
statements and the set of actions held by the state. However, even with explicit 
statements of leaders, one cannot be sure about the real intentions. There might be 
deeper plots within the state policies. However, this does not weaken the assumption 
of Aquinas. When the state publicly announces its intention, and obtains the intended 
good, the legitimacy of intervention is considerably strengthened. On the other hand, 
in case of an obtained good, which is an accidental result of an action which is not 
related to humanitarian concerns and where there is not a public intention for the 
good, the case for legitimacy will be much more dubious than the former case and 
remain weak. 
On the other hand, if a good intention does not bring the target good for many 
reasons like unproportional use of force, lacking enough commitment or resources 
and etc., the intervention cannot be regarded as legitimate. Though, every variable 
cannot be calculated in the course of intervention, this will cause the states to take 
more points into their consideration and prevent them from embarking on adventures 
the results of which are not clear enough. 
 
B. Proportionate War  
 
Any use of force should be proportionate to achieving the humanitarian 
purpose and carried out in accordance with international law. We should 
be sure that the scale of potential or actual human suffering justifies the 
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dangers of military action. And it must be likely to achieve its 
objectives.242 
 
As depicted in the first chapter, proportionality is a criterion of just war 
thinking in order to regulate jus in bellum, the conduct of war. When proportionate 
use of force is at issue, the consideration is that “the means deployed in fighting a 
war must be proportionate to ends.”243 In other words, the force used to stop a 
violation of human security or to halt suffering of people should not cause greater 
suffering and remain limited as much as possible.244 In addition, such force should be 
deployed for a period required for the accomplishment of desired ends, not longer.245 
Another meaning of the proportionality, in terms of Just War criteria based on 
Thomas Aquinas’s ‘Double Effect Doctrine’ is that a war or an action on behalf of 
humanitarianism, in the modern sense, should generate greater good than the targeted 
evil. Although, Iraq is a contentious case for humanitarian intervention, there is a 
point in the historical course of the conflict. After the first Gulf War in 1991, 
economic sanctions were deployed to get the Saddam Hussein regime to comply with 
the demands of the international community. However, they eventually inflicted 
greater harm on the people than on the regime, as they deprived people from the 
essential nutrition and medicine, and caused the death of nearly 500.000 children 
under five years old until 2003.246 And the international community insisted on the 
continuance of the sanctions regime despite the deaths and the spread of disease as 
well as the success of Saddam Hussein to remain in power.247  
Concerning the use of force, the intervening force in a humanitarian 
intervention, different from a war in which the main target is to destroy the opponent 
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forces, aims to stop the suffering of innocent people, establish peace and restore the 
rule of law. Then, the intervening force should plan and foresee the necessary and 
proportionate force required to meet the desired ends. 248 
Since the criterion of proportionality requires achieving more good than 
causing more harm as a consequence of resorting to force, it necessarily embodies 
certain consequentialist traits.249 As shown in the previous section, in terms of the 
consequentialist evaluation of humanitarian intervention it is the humanitarian gains 
through which the success, legitimacy or morality of an intervention are weighed. 
That criterion approaches the morality issue from a utilitarian perspective in that 
when more harm is caused than the aimed good, the time and resources for the 
operation are considered to have been wasted in vain.250  
Mona Fixdal and Dan Smith suggest that it would be more reasonable for an 
actor or group of actors to consider the consequences in terms of doing good or harm 
with a as much detailed calculation as possible. Such calculation may include a 
“feasibility test”, which is similar to the SWOT analysis in business management, in 
order to examine the existing strengths, facilities, and capabilities.251 Nevertheless, 
Michael Walzer criticizes the notion of calculation as he states that it is almost 
impossible to have an accurate calculation of good and harm that are probably to 
come out of an intervention. This is because the main predictions are made through 
the variables which are based on non-mathematical values such as “the value of a 
country’s independence against the value of the lives that might be lost in defending 
it.”252 The same point is also highlighted by Heinze in his reference to the disposal of 
the Saddam regime in Iraq. He argues that it cannot be known in advance whether 
the regime change by foreign intervention into a country will bring good or more 
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harm. He adds that the situation would improve if a stable government could be 
established in the place of the deposed government.253 
In modern warfare, the most important problem in disproportionate use of 
force has been the air campaigns with their targeting of essential civilian structures, 
inflicting collateral damage and causing high civilian deaths.254 As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the NATO’s 1999 intervention to Kosovo was much criticized 
because of its violation of the principle to use proportionate force and its causing 
more harm than the desired good.255 In that intervention there are three points that do 
not befit the perspective of morality:  i) the use of force harmed the civilians; ii) the 
action caused more harm rather than suspending it; iii) the interveners gave priority 
to the lives of their own soldiers to the detriment of those that needed help. The first 
and the last points in particular are closely interwoven. 
To start from the last point, it concerned the NATO commanders’ decision to 
employ high altitude bombing over 15.000 feet and their reluctance to deploy land 
forces to repel Serbian forces from Kosovo.256  
As to the first point, the conduct of the bombing campaign in Kosovo, there 
are contentious views. For instance, Hugh Walker refers to the presence of military 
lawyers during the campaign and their adherence to the fourth Geneva Convention 
which prohibits damaging civilian targets. Walker adds that the precision-guided 
missile technology also had great contribution to the campaign. It was claimed that 
99 % of the missiles hit their targets. Independent International Commission on 
Kosovo (IICK) also acknowledged this claim and found no proof for deliberate 
targeting of the civilians.257 According to this view, the absence of any proof for the 
intentional targeting of the civilian targets as well as the use of precision guided 
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weaponry points to the calculation of “means and ends” before the intervention.258 
On the other hand, Grant argues that the NATO could overcome the problem of 
intentional targeting of Serbian civilian targets during the air campaign by referring 
to Article 52 (2) of Protocol I of the Geneva Convention. According to that article, 
when a means offered “a definite military advantage” to secure the end (in the 
Kosovo case, one of the aims of the military campaign was to get the Serbian 
administration to attend the Rambouillet Talks), that means would be used.259 
However, the NATO representatives did not describe the NATO action as a means 
fitting into the provision of Article 52 (2). On the other hand, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) considered that point while 
deciding on the accusations against the NATO intervention by the Serbian 
government when it decreed that no more investigation was required against the 
interveners. The same was also considered by the Independent International 
Commission on Kosovo (IICK). However, these clarifications were made under the 
heading of the causes of intervention, not the use of means. And in relation to the 
subject, Walker also confirms the uncertainty on the issue of selection of the “means 
employed”.260  
For the second point, concerning the issue of relative benefit/harm resulting 
the intervention, the views are also contentious. Firstly, the criticisms made against 
the NATO intervention to Kosovo focus on the point that the air campaign got 
Milosevic to force thousands of Kosovar Albanians to leave their homes. And this 
negative result is coupled with the fact that the attack on civilian infrastructure also 
caused harsh living conditions for the civilian population in the region, aggravating 
the aggregate wellbeing of people.261 However, this view is encountered with 
another, as of Jane Stromseth. She argues that the aim of generating greater good was 
achieved by Kosovo intervention as people no more suffer, and a new government 
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came to power for the administration of Kosovo.262 According to this view, 
intervention is inevitable for accomplishing greater humanitarian good and some 
casualties should be tolerated. The clearest words to describe this stance were 
expressed by Jamie Shea, a spokesperson of NATO, in a speech on just war in 1999: 
“The ulcer cannot be removed from the stomach, unless the patient is operated 
upon.”263 
 
C. Saving Soldiers or Saving Strangers? 
 
Another debate which is closely related with the previous debate of 
proportionality is the question of whether states should risk the lives of their own 
soldiers to save strangers.  
One of the criticisms made against humanitarian intervention is that states 
should not risk the lives of their own soldiers or bear economic costs for the sake of 
people other than their own.264 This view derives from the realist idea that states act 
only upon their national interest with a sound calculation of the gains and losses. In a 
calculation on intervention, the gains are the acquired interest, while the losses 
concern, among others, the lives of soldiers and economic costs. From that 
perspective since states are only responsible for the security of their own citizens and 
intervening for humanitarian reasons only does not serve national interest, 
humanitarian intervention is unacceptable.265 And even if it is accepted that states 
have the right or duty to employ their soldiers and resources for humanitarian 
intervention, not all states are granted the right. The state to intervene should have 
the necessary capability and resources to act, otherwise it would bring more harm 
than the desired good.266 The inefficiency of interveners has been at issue for the 
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African Union (AU) interventions in Darfur, where the AU proved its inefficiency to 
stop killings. According to Wheeler, if one accepts the realist premise of using forces 
and resources only for the national interest, then there will be no solution in that 
debate.267  
Foreign military intervention has always been a policy tool whether it is held 
for self-defense, aggression or humanitarian purposes. Since the government risks 
the lives of its own soldiers, citizens, then the intervention should have an interest at 
its core.268 
Allen Buchanan differentiates between the internal and external legitimacy of 
an intervention. For external legitimacy, the intervention should be accepted by the 
target community as well as the international community. As for the internal 
legitimacy, it has two dimensions. Buchanan describes the internal legitimacy as ‘the 
discretionary association’. It holds that a government and its citizens have 
responsibilities to each other. Government is responsible for the well being of its 
own citizens and cannot deploy its soldiers in risky humanitarian missions. Acting 
otherwise is not considered legitimate in this regard. On the other hand, citizens 
confer some of their rights to the state with the expectation that their security will be 
ensured. Soldiers are also part of those citizens and share a similar expectation.  The 
state should use its soldiers for the purpose of self-defense. If it acts on motives other 
than self-defense, it is against this social contract.269 
Similar to Buchanan’s view on internal legitimacy, James Pattison states that 
a humanitarian intervention, which aims at improving the human security in the 
target country, decreases the security of its citizens, soldiers. Then the state loses 
internal legitimacy on performing humanitarian intervention.270 
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On the other hand, the above view based on the rationalist and especially 
realist reasoning is not the only one and the following statement might be considered 
and should be noted as an important questioning of the realist view: “If states are 
presumed to only engage in humanitarian action to defend or advance their interests, 
then questions regarding the legitimacy of risking soldiers’ lives to save strangers 
should never arise.”271 If today states by militarily intervening are provoking the 
realist arguments of irrationalism and internal illegitimacy, then they should not be 
acting out of pure self-interest but humanitarian reasons.272  
Michael Walzer also states that there is a difference between the soldiers who 
fight to defend their own country and the humanity. Those fighting for the sake of 
humanity may not prefer (if they could have chosen) to risk their lives when 
compared to fighting for their own country.273 Moreover Walzer argues that leaders 
should not require soldiers to sacrifice themselves for the sake of strangers. 
However, if combatants are free of such a risk, then intervention to stop human 
suffering can be possible. Walzer states that the guided missiles, along with the long-
range weapons preventing hot contact between armies of the intervening and target 
states, enable interventions with lesser risks for the lives of soldiers. He adds that 
such a war without the risk of a counter attack does not also infringe the just war 
principles as long as civilians are not harmed.274 Although this view cannot 
legitimize the wrongs in the Kosovo intervention, it may cast light on the problem 
and contribute to a possible solution.  
Fernando R. Teson also detects the problem with humanitarian intervention 
concerning the risk it poses to soldiers’ lives. He states that regularly conscripted 
soldiers, in line with the social contract that define the mutual responsibilities of the 
state and the citizen, will fight for the defense of the state and to pursue its interests. 
However, they will not be eager to fight to save lives that do not belong to their 
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fellow citizens.275 Teson’s suggestion is to deploy voluntary armed forces in 
humanitarian interventions. Such troops will not question their involvement in the 
action since that will be their reason to join the armed forces.276  
The last problem on the dilemma between saving soldiers and strangers is that 
the public reaction to the soldiers’ death is an important reason in deciding to act or 
not. The US government lost its interest in the intervention to Somalia after losing its 
soldiers in Mogadishu in 1993, the event which became the topic for Hollywood 
movies.277 The US intervention in Somalia was initially problematic. The US 
miscalculation of threats and losses led to the perceptional failure of the intervention. 
The US planners could not foresee that their own soldiers might be targeted and give 
casualties.278 
The casualties in Somalia marked the beginning of the disengagement policy 
of the US and the other governments vis-à-vis the humanitarian crises. 279  
Governments who responded to the events in Rwanda in 1994 prioritized the safety 
of their military and civilian staff over that of the Rwandan people. For instance, 
following the onset of the genocide, ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed on 14 
April 1994, prompting the Belgian government to decide to withdraw its troops. 
Then, although Roméo Dallaire, the commander of UNAMIR, declared that around 
5.000 troops were required to stop the genocide, the Security Council decided to 
leave only 270 troops in Rwanda and limit the mandate.280 Such disengagement and 
reluctance to act were also observed by the late and limited intervention in Bosnia in 
1995, Kosovo in 1999 and Darfur in 2003.  
The leaders’ disinterest in deploying troops to the emergencies is also based 
on the fact that they do not want to lose the support of their constituencies for risking 
the lives of soldiers. On the one hand, one can talk about the ‘CNN effect’ which 
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refers to the public pressure on the government to act when the scenes of suffering 
people are displayed on the media. However, when the news of casualties (dead 
and/or injured soldiers) arrive, then people begin to criticize the intervention in 
question and quit supporting it.281  
The debate of saving soldiers or strangers has been a contentious issue 
regarding the morality of the intervention since the Somalia intervention of the US, 
and it has been intensified by the Kosovo intervention. And if the question of 
humanitarian intervention is to be resolved, this issue cannot be ignored. 
 
D. Provoked Masses, Abused Interveners 
 
In “The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the 
Balkans”, Alan J. Kuperman mentions an ignored or much abused moral problem of 
humanitarian intervention.282 According to him, with the increasingly deterrent effect 
of the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention against genocidal action, 
minorities have been encouraged to act against the host state even if they are under a 
threat of brutal retaliation. On the other hand, it is generally the case that a 
humanitarian intervention cannot fully protect the rebels.283 
This problem which Kuperman calls as ‘the moral hazard of humanitarian 
intervention’ has its roots in the economy. According to that concept, actors who are 
under protection against the market risks (generally through insurances), act more 
recklessly than those who are under risk without any insurance. Likewise, the 
possibility of diplomatic or military intervention encourages secessionist movements 
even though they are exposed to the threat of the use of disproportionate force by the 
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host state.284 According to Kuperman, the moral hazard has two dangers. Firstly, it 
causes irresponsible movements and decisions of the group leaders. Since they are 
provoked by the possibility of the humanitarian intervention in favor of their cause, 
the rebels take up arms with a view to secessionism without calculating their losses 
or, at least, they consider as reasonable the possible losses to arise from retaliation. 
They believe that they will achieve freedom under the protection of humanitarian 
intervention.285 
Secondly, the rebels may deliberately provoke the intervention of outside 
actors, abusing it for their own cause. They may attack the government’s forces to 
induce retaliation, which will create an environment where civilians are likely to 
suffer. Such a scenery will draw international reactions and is likely to be followed 
by an intervention.286  
Concerning the Bosnian declaration of independence, Izetbegovic and other 
political figures of Bosnian Muslims initially did not opt for the independence. They 
negotiate with the Bosnian Serb and Belgrade administration. However, after ten 
days, the Bosnian Muslims left and renounced the negotiations and began to arm 
themselves, although the Serbian army was much more powerful than them.287  
According to Kuperman, the power inequality between the parties was so obvious 
that there was no room for miscalculation of losses, but the Muslims did not 
withdraw. The answer to this policy change might be found in the sentences of 
Izetbegovic as he addressed the parliament on 14 October 1991: ‘‘Will we accept 
peace at any price in Bosnia, bend our heads once and for all, because of peace 
accept an inferior position for the next 15 years, or shall we say, we want 
sovereignty, risking a conflict?’’288 According to Kuperman, the possible loss of the 
Muslims was considered as reasonable to attract the attention of the international 
community to intervene in the region and the Muslim leadership continued in this 
way which ended up as it was told in the previous chapter.289 
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In Kosovo, the issue of moral abuse is much more evident. Until 1997, 
Kosovar Albanians enjoyed somewhat de facto autonomy as they could hold their 
own elections and maintain their own education system through peaceful policies of 
Ibrahim Rugova. This period ended with Kosovo Liberation Army’s (KLA) attacks 
on Serbian police as it was retaliated by Belgrade.290 The rebellion cannot be 
explained through miscalculation of Serbian retaliation. And at that time, there was 
no sign of Serbian genocide as the setting was peaceful until KLA started its 
attacks.291 Kosovar Albanians also did not expect to ruin the Serbian army by 
themselves.292  
Briefly, the peaceful stance of the Kosovo administration was actually a 
strategy. Since, they did not have the military power, they had to remain peaceful.293 
Meanwhile, the KLA ranks were aware of their weakness and started to believe that 
they had to gain international support for independence, which can be inferred from 
their statements. They had too limited access to arms until 1997 when they could 
provide the necessary weapons from Albania. After that date, KLA began to act in 
order to provoke retaliation of the Serbian Army with a view to drawing attention of 
the international community.294 The NATO has been aware of this problem at least 
since 1998. During the Kosovo conflict the NATO tried to decrease the violence and 
they were aware of the fact that their air campaign was initially caused by nothing 
but the Kosovar aggression. However, nothing has changed or no steps have been 
taken against this moral abuse since then.295 
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E. Nirvana Fallacy296 
 
According to the general belief of the pro-intervention side, foreign military 
intervention into a humanitarian crisis generates more good than non-intervention. 
However, when the data on the successful humanitarian intervention is analyzed, it is 
seen that the result has not always been a success. It should be noted that a successful 
intervention not only means the cessation of inhumane behavior that shocks the 
human conscience, but it also includes the reconstruction of the institutions and the 
society in order to prevent the suffering from happening again. Accordingly, as an 
example, only 26 % of the US interventions and initiatives to reconstruct the 
institutions have been successful since the late 19th century.297  
There is a tendency among the governments that are unable to distribute the 
necessary security and human goods that these tasks can be met better by foreign 
governments, although this is not true. This is called ‘Nirvana Fallacy’, which is 
mainly observed in regions where central government cannot function properly or 
totally failed. Such an assumption ignores several possibilities including that foreign 
intervention may not succeed; that efforts may culminate in more harm than the 
designed good; and that local government may establish or modify institutions better 
than foreign governments.298    
This problem, though not much covered in the literature, is an important 
impediment for the development of regional intergovernmental institutions, which 
can take action on humanitarian emergencies, and complicates a legitimate solution 
as target governments tend to underestimate their capabilities or tend not to take the 
trouble to act while the West is waiting out there to intervene. 
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F. Inability or Reluctance to Intervene? 
 
The debate on the inaction or selective response of states to humanitarian 
conflicts is one of the most contentious topics, which concerns the morality and 
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. The inaction or selective responses of the 
Western powers to humanitarian crisis have been a question since the end of the Cold 
War.299  
As for the selectivity problem, the main issue seems to be the question of 
whether an intervention is held out of genuine humanitarian motives. The criticism is 
that targets for intervention are selected on the basis of the national interests such as 
strategic gains or losses. For instance, a Western state would not intervene in a 
country which is a strategic ally or partner, or an important market.300 Unfortunately, 
as explained above, the real motives can never be known.  
David Chandler analyzed the reactions of the US to the human rights 
violations around the world. He states that the US would voluntarily take the lead to 
condemn or sanction states such as Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Serbia, 
Sudan and Syria, while it does nothing against those in Egypt, Israel, Mexico, Saudi 
Arabia, since it considers doing so against American interests.301 A similar and 
directly related comparison is the NATO’s Kosovo intervention and the non-
intervention into Sudan. Kosovo as a country in Europe had to be settled, otherwise 
the Western powers would have been accused for having failed to clean their own 
backyard. However, the Sudanese case involved neither the prestige nor the security 
of the West in a significant way.302 The selective response of the West to Kosovo and 
Sudan provoked three sarcastic criteria: in order for the Americans to intervene, 
those being killed should be white Europeans; the target state which causes the 
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human suffering should not be an American ally; and there should be intense media 
coverage of the intervention.303 
Thus, the Western intervention record and the inconsistency of these 
interventions clearly reveal that the West has selectively intervened so far. The main 
reason of this selectiveness is the lack of large resources.304 And as Wheeler 
suggests, the possibility of selective (abusive) response can never be eliminated from 
the practice.305 However, the basis on which the West chooses its targets to intervene 
is still cannot be explained truly. Then the question which should be asked again is: 
‘how the selection is driven?’ or ‘what causes states to ignore a case and to intervene 
in another?’  
The authorization process of the intervention is also claimed to be selective or 
unequal. Here, the problem is that the resolution which authorizes the humanitarian 
intervention is taken by the Security Council members and especially with the 
influence of the Permanent-5 (P-5). Then, if a P-5 member commits humanitarian 
crimes, it will be invulnerable against any resolution by its veto power or it will veto 
any resolution against its interests.306 
As a point concerning both morality and legitimacy, the essence of selectivity 
problem lies within this core moral question: ‘are those saved more human or 
precious than those who are not?’307 The main criticism on the selectivity problem is 
that it is not applied consistently and this shadows the universality claims of 
intervention. In this regard, the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention cannot be 
claimed since universality and impartiality are deemed to be the legitimacy criteria of 
humanitarian intervention. In other words, arbitrary application of a norm damages 
its moral argument.308  
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During the course of this study, it has been observed that almost every scholar 
acknowledges the existence of selective action whether they support or criticize 
humanitarian intervention. For this reason, this section looks at the rationale that is 
put forth. In this regard one can identify four main reasons that are given for the 
selectivity issue: humanitarian intervention is a voluntary duty but not an obligation; 
intervention is interest-driven; scarce resources; and outcomes of  intervention. 
First of all, in terms of legal arguments, although the legality of humanitarian 
intervention is another source of conflict per se, it is claimed that humanitarian 
intervention norm only casts a duty which will be performed on voluntary basis. 
According to J. L. Holzgrefe, unauthorized humanitarian intervention is a permissive 
norm, meaning that it allows the members of the international community to act, but 
it is not a mandatory norm obliging them to act on humanitarian crisis. He argues 
that unauthorized humanitarian intervention can hardly be considered as customary 
law, and the selectivity problem renders that even more difficult. The problem of not 
being accepted as customary law can be clearly seen in the UN General Assembly 
Resolutions, which denies such an unauthorized right to intervene.309 
Another reason for the occurrence of selectivity is tied to the scarce resources 
of the interveners. It is argued that while there is a continuous rise in the human 
rights violations, the states capable of intervening remain the same in number and 
with the same resource availability. Then these states will have to pick out from 
among the cases as it is impossible to intervene in all cases with limited resources. 
Selection is inevitable.310 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams also comment that 
for an immediate reply to stop human violations more states can be found in terms of 
a military intervention. However, since the peace-building and the restructuring of 
economic and social facilities will require more resources after the emergency phase 
of the crisis is over, less states will remain as available donors of intervention.311 
Even the UN, which is the legal overseer of any intervention and forceful non-
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military intervention around the world, receives “a little fraction of the total military 
spending” of the world, and its budget is limited.312  
Other than the limited resources, the outcome of intervention, which is also a 
criterion of just war, is considered to be a reason for selective intervention. 
Accordingly, states may not intervene in the conflicts where more harm than more 
good is likely to result. This is called moderate instrumentalist approach.313 
Therefore, the West does not prefer to engage in conflicts in the third world where its 
intervention will cause reactions especially in its former colonies, or where there is 
religious militancy against the West as in the Darfur case, or where regional actors 
were granted some mandate and expected to end the suffering of people with limited 
military and economic resources.314 The Western states also try to avoid intervening 
in a country which holds nuclear power out of fear of retaliation and the outbreak of 
a nuclear war.315 
An additional point should also be made regarding the outcome oriented 
view. As well as the envisioned success, the intervention should also be ‘internally 
effective’. ‘Internal effectiveness’ means that an intervention should not excessively 
decrease the appropriate level of security and enjoyment of human rights. The 
soldiers and aid workers of the intervening state may naturally give some losses. 
However, if these are likely to be excessive, a state may choose not to intervene. 
Thus the state which has the internal legitimacy will have a strong hand at home to 
intervene in case of a human rights violation.316 The lack of internal legitimacy may 
lead to non-intervention or limited contribution of the state to a conflict. For 
example, the appearance on the media of the killed US soldiers in Somalia created “a 
reverse CNN effect” on the US public, which had previously supported the 
intervention. This was an important cause of US non-intervention in Rwanda317.  
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Apart from the humanitarian intervention, even the procurement of aid has 
become selective. For instance, in Bosnia when Milosevic was in power, the EU aid 
and development programs were provided on a selective basis. The programs 
excluded the Serbian populated areas from receiving the aids. This selectiveness in 
aid provision causes a schism in the international relations. While a group of 
scholars, NGOs and IGO branches strictly criticize the selectivity, another group 
supports it as a tool of justice.318 For Chandler, this shows the change in 
humanitarianism, from the old one based on the principles of universality and 
impartiality to the new one based on the partial and selective action.319 
In conclusion, selectivity, both in intervention and aid programs, is 
undeniably an existing problem, which is believed to be caused by the reasons cited 
above. It is related both with the motives and interests, and internal legitimacy 
problem. They are interwoven and cannot be solved separately. Selectivity problem 
is a good example describing the ‘Gordian Knot’ of humanitarian intervention. 
 
G. Who Decides? 
 
As mentioned previously, one of the Just War criteria, which mainly drive the 
humanitarian intervention doctrine, is the existence of a right authority to evaluate 
the legitimacy of an intervention and to have the final say on the matter.320 The 
requirement of the right or legitimate authority to decide on intervention is also one 
of the subjects of the legal debate. The ‘right authority’ debate was selected as the 
last topic of this section as a means of transition to the legal debate. 
The realist point of view rejects the existence of such a criterion as it entirely 
rejects the possibility of a legitimate humanitarian intervention. In the realist view, 
states are the only authority to decide and judge their own actions. International law 
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cannot be applicable, since there is no authority higher than states in the anarchic 
international system.321 
The requirement for the right authority as today’s international body has its 
roots in the classical Just War thinking provision that the princes of the old, taking 
their reign from God, had the authority to wage war. Thus, only the wars which were 
waged to establish the rule of God on earth could be legitimate and just.  
At present this authority is regarded as being presented by an international 
institution, which represents the will of all people in the world. Wheeler and Bellamy 
think that such an authority is currently the UN. And they argue that UN Security 
Council resolution should be sought before intervening in a humanitarian emergency. 
However, they argue that the Permanent Five should leave their veto rights and their 
national interest concerns aside in cases of humanitarian intervention.322  
Michael Walzer also points to the UN, as the most suitable international and 
multilateral decision-maker on humanitarian intervention. This is because, he argues, 
the UN represents the common will of the largest group of people on earth. However, 
Walzer also points to the deficiency of the slow bureaucracy in the UN mechanism. 
This is one of the causes of the delayed reaction or inaction of the UN toward the 
humanitarian tragedies as well as the veto obstacle of the P-5.323 Here the point is 
that the UN decision making system cannot have a swift, efficient operation in terms 
of taking a resolution to authorize intervention. Even if the call for the Security 
Council’s meeting is announced on the same day of the conflict’s eruption, the 
resolution can only be obtained after the civilians and/or innocents were injured or 
killed. On the other hand, the meeting of the Security Council does not provide a 
guarantee of intervention, given the different security concerns of its members. 
Among them Russia and China have been historically wary of the possible abuse of 
humanitarian discourse by the Western powers to intervene into their domestic 
affairs. 
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The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
also views the UN as the right authority. However, it states that if the UN fails to act, 
it is the regional organizations which hold the responsibility to act under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter.324 
This view is also shared by Kofi Annan in his report of ‘the UN High-level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’ published in 2004: 
We identify a set of guidelines – five criteria of legitimacy – which we 
believe that the Security Council (and anyone else involved in these 
decisions) should always address in considering whether to authorize or 
apply military force.325 
 
Those states like Russia and China as well as the non-Aligned Movement, 
which doubt the humanitarian intervention as a tool for the global dominance of the 
West, deem the UN as the sole authority to decide on intervention. They oppose any 
approach which tries to find alternatives to the UN authority. These states accept that 
the UN system is problematic, and instead of finding or forming an alternative 
institution, they suggest increasing the political will to intervene. They claim that the 
main problem is not the lack of authority but the lack of political will when 
necessary.326 What these non-Western states mean is that the West should intervene 
into every humanitarian emergency without discrimination, if it is sincere in its will 
to help. The problem with this argument is that these states critical of the Western 
selectiveness ignore the question of scarce resources. The existing resources are 
simply not enough to intervene in every conflict. 
Though there are different views in the literature on the subject of right 
authority, the problem can be better reflected when two cases are compared. In 
Rwanda case France was authorized to intervene by the UN Security Council 
Resolution 929. And prior to the resolution France had declared its decision not to 
intervene without a resolution. And there is no need to mention the reluctance of the 
international society to intervene. On the other hand, in Kosovo case where NATO 
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used force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the NATO as a regional 
organization did not seek for a UN resolution due to the fact that Russia and China 
would use veto if the matter was brought before the Security Council.327 
When combined with the selectivity debate, the problem of intervention 
without an authorizing UN Resolution bears two views on the reforms. On the one 
side, there is the view that the humanitarian intervention should be subject to the UN 
authority, not a regional security institution like the NATO, because regional 
institutions can act with national interest considerations of their members. On the 
other side, the belief that the UN is not sufficient to act as an authority is further 
divided into different sub-views. These views range from the advocacy of the 
reforming of the UN structure to the one supporting those regional organizations like 
the EU and the NATO should have the authority to decide. But the main debate 
between those arguing that the UN or the regional organizations should authorize 
interventions and those realists claiming that the international system is deprived of 
an international judge to authorize them still remains. 
 
III. LEGALITY ASSERTIONS 
 
This part will look into the debate on the legality of humanitarian 
intervention. The historical evolution of the international law was briefly reviewed in 
the previous chapter. This part shall present the conflicting views of the legality of 
humanitarian intervention.  
The core of the legal debate on humanitarian intervention lies in the gap 
between the positivist view, which upholds state sovereignty over other things and 
the naturalist view, which defends a gradual development and change in norms as per 
the requirements to meet the use of force for humanitarian purposes, as Jennifer M. 
Welsh states.328 In other words, the tension is between those who support the positive 
                                                           
327
 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, p. 16. 
328
 Welsh, p. 503. 
90 
 
law at one side, and those support the natural law on the other.329 Then, there are two 
ends of this debate: the rule of sovereignty which is supported by the legal positivist 
approach and the rule of morality over sovereignty considerations which are 
supported by the moralist approach.  
 
A) Legal Positivist Approach 
 
According to the strict positivist approach, which takes the UN Charter as the 
sole source of present day international order along with other binding agreements 
signed in line with it, the humanitarian intervention is not applicable since the 
Charter bans intervention into the domestic affairs of other states. This 
inapplicability begins with the assumption of the international law that all states are 
equal sovereigns as depicted in Article 2 (1) of the UN Charter.330 This feature does 
not suit the rationale behind the humanitarian intervention, because according to the 
moralist approach intervention can be held upon the decision of those states capable 
of intervening even if there is no UN authorization. Then the moralist view is not 
different than the approach which did not respect the sovereignty of the colonial 
areas in the age of colonialism. Legalist approach strictly criticizes such an attempt 
to classify the sovereigns and to decide on the sovereign rights of a state. Mohammed 
Ayoob emphasizes this issue, underlining the illegitimacy as well as the illegality of 
humanitarian intervention. He maintains that such an approach of delineating the 
qualities for sovereignty resembles the ‘European Civilizations Standards” of the 19th 
century which were deemed a guide for the conferral of sovereign rights.331 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the legalist approach’s focal point is 
the principle of non-intervention. And the conflict arises between the positivist and 
the moralist approach when the latter seeks to change the international law from its 
existing form into what it should be. Such a normative approach is completely 
against the separatist view of the positivism which differentiates lex lata (the existing 
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law) and lex ferenda (the law as it should be).332 Accordingly, the international law is 
what states consent to abide by and posit themselves accordingly. At this point, the 
view converges with the realist understanding that though state sovereignty derives 
from the common will of people, domestic law flows top-down, not vice versa. The 
situation is the same in international law, as states mould the law according to their 
own will and interest, not that of humanity or the international citizen.333 The 
international law is generated through either treaties or state practice (customary 
law).334 
The central claims about the illegality of humanitarian intervention is caused 
by Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, which forbids the use or threat of force among 
states except for Article 51, which allows to use force for self defense against an 
imminent attack, and the Chapter VII provisions, according to which UN Security 
Council may authorize the use of force when international security is at stake.335  
On the other hand, some scholars who are critical of the humanitarian 
intervention argue that interventions to humanitarian emergencies should be 
excluded from the Chapter VII authorization, because they are intra-state conflicts, 
not international conflicts causing insecurity at the international level.336 
Since the unauthorized intervention, which is supported by the moralist view, 
is not regarded as an exception to the prohibition to use force, humanitarian 
intervention is illegal in the positivist view. They support their illegality claim by 
referring to the following sections of the international law: Article 2 (4) of the UN 
Charter as mentioned before; Articles 53 and 64 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, which accept Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter as an inviolable 
international principle (i.e. jus cogens) along with Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter, 
which block authorization of the UN intervention to states’ domestic affairs; and the 
1970 General Assembly Resolution Declaration on Principles of International Law 
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Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States (2625-XXV), which 
prohibits the use or threat of force by states in their relations with one another.337 
It should be noted that the positivist approach does criticize the attempts to 
legalize humanitarian intervention but it does not totally ignore the humanitarian 
interventions against states committing gross human rights violations. In this regard, 
A. O. Enabulele introduces a constructive study. In his article “Humanitarian 
intervention and territorial sovereignty: the dilemma of two strange bedfellows”, he 
refers to the moralist claims of legality on the basis of the international treaties and 
the customary law as the sources of international law.  
To begin with customary international law, it consists of state practice and 
opinio juris. A law can be regarded as customary only if it meets the requirements of 
both of these components. Firstly, the moralist approach gives many accounts of 
unilateral and multilateral intervention in history without the authorization of an 
international institution, such as the 1827-1830 interventions of the UK, Russia and 
France to Greece to stop the suppression of the rioting Greek people under the 
Ottoman rule, Russian intervention in Bulgaria between 1876-1878 with similar 
reasons, Indian intervention in Pakistan in 1971 and the NATO intervention in 
Kosovo in 1999. The claim of the moralist approach is that the behaviour of states 
during the course of history against similar events has constituted a pattern, which 
should form the basis of state practice to compose customary law.338 Enabulele 
points to two points as preventing the humanitarian intervention from being counted 
as state practice. Firstly, he states that throughout all the interventions cited in the 
historical account, there is no consistent reaction or behavior even by a smallest 
portion of the states, as they have chosen not to act in the same manner against every 
similar situation. Secondly, no humanitarian justification can circumvent the basic 
principle that states have inviolable sovereignty within their territory and states’ 
practice have been in a way to support and strengthen this norm.339 
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The opinio juris too cannot be achieved due to the selective or reluctant 
intervention of states. For instance, although the Vietnam War is not a case of 
humanitarian intervention, but an example for third party intervention, the US 
sacrificed about 58.000 soldiers in Vietnam and continued to fight until the end of 
the war. However, the US withdrew its military when only a very small number of its 
soldiers were killed in Somalia. This comparison shows that states do not consider it 
an obligation to join or maintain a humanitarian intervention.340 The point is that 
while the US had vested interest in Vietnam, it did not have the same in Somalia. 
And the US chose to withdraw from Somalia where it intervened for humanitarian 
cause. 
Enabulele says that there is a common understanding that there are no 
international legal treaties, which allow unauthorized intervention. However, he adds 
that in the face of a humanitarian emergency, the clash between the international law 
and the morality of human conscience is inevitable.341 Then, in such a situation the 
quest should be to have sincere motives to help those in need instead of finding legal 
excuses for intervention or establishing a legal body to authorize and commence 
humanitarian intervention. Such a clash can only be overcome through sincere and 
consistent action against humanitarian emergencies.342 
In short, the positivist side mainly holds that humanitarian intervention 
cannot be undertaken at the expense of state sovereignty and principle of non-
intervention. Such a trade off only eases the abuse of humanitarianism for strategic 
and national interest concerns of greater powers over weak states. 
 
B) Legal Moralist Approach 
 
While the legal positivist approach defends state sovereignty and its corollary 
principle of non-intervention, the moralist approach argues for a different type of 
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sovereignty, which is embodied in the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine. Although 
many moralist concerns are legitimate from the perspective of human rights, they are 
generally rendered futile by the international law, since the issue of humanitarian 
intervention is not openly covered in that law. Then a legitimization is required and 
the international law should be reformed accordingly.343 
At the core of the primary objection to the existing international legal norms 
stands the inviolability of state sovereignty. The theorists of moralist fashion claim 
that the inviolable sovereignty is not an ultimate fact but only a historical concept 
deriving from the necessities of the 16th and 17th centuries to set a peaceful 
international order.344 However, that order has not excluded non-intervention. In 
terms of ‘distributive conception’, states are granted the right to govern their 
autonomous territories through recognition by the international society of their 
sovereign rights. Then, if sovereignty is granted by the international society, this 
society may also intervene to that autonomy, and such intervention would not be 
against the law as it would be actually not an intervention but only a redistribution of 
sovereignty.345 
According to some moralists, humanitarian intervention actually does not 
violate sovereign rights of the target state. Julie Mertus addresses these moralist 
claims in her article. The first moralist argument is that humanitarian intervention 
does not violate territorial sovereignty. They claim that humanitarian intervention 
does not target the territorial integrity of the violating state, or limit or deprive the 
state authority from its sovereign rights. However, Mertus states that the present 
concept of sovereignty is not only related with the territoriality but also with the 
state’s ability to rule its subjects directly. Where and whenever this ability is limited 
or totally blocked, it means there is violation of sovereignty. She gives the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia as an example where Kosovo was territorially and 
administratively bound. The intervention did not target a territorial division but it 
ended the Belgrade’s rule on Prishtina, which culminated in turn in the secession of 
Kosovo. Though the intervention did not initially target the territorial break of 
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Kosovo from the FRY, it ceased Belgrade’s rule over Kosovo, violating its 
sovereignty.346 
Secondly, moralist view argues that some cases require humanitarian 
intervention with an alternative reading of the UN Charter provisions. For instance, 
Article 2 (4) prohibits states to act in ways against the purposes of the UN to ensure 
the international peace and security. Then, humanitarian intervention, as in Kosovo, 
may be regarded as not violating UN Charter in line with that purpose. There might 
be some cases where the principles and purposes of UN may only be protected 
through a military intervention.347  
In connection with Kosovo intervention, another claim of the moralist view 
should be addressed. In Kosovo the intervention was held by the NATO without any 
UN authorization. The moralist view justifies the intervention held by a regional 
security organization by referring to the UN Chapter VII, which holds that the 
regional security organizations may intervene to the humanitarian emergencies which 
disturb and jeopardize the international security. However, humanitarian intervention 
through a regional security organization still remains illegal without the UN 
authorization in terms of the existing legal setting.348 
Another alternative reading covers Articles 55 and 56 of the UN charter. 
According to these provisions, all members are mandated to take joint action by the 
UN for the protection and observance of respect of the human rights for all. Then 
every state is actually authorized to intervene where human rights are under attack.349 
Finally, Mertus criticizes that the UN system is not properly operating in the 
face of human suffering, though one of the original intentions behind the UN idea 
was to eliminate and stop suffering after the miserable experience of the Second 
World War. Therefore, regional organizations or group of states should be able to 
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operate where the UN is unable to operate due to the procedural obstacles like the P-
5 veto.350 
All these criticisms and claims contributed to the formation of the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine, which seeks to transform state sovereignty from 
an absolute to a conditional concept. The doctrine advocates that granting of 
sovereignty to a state should be conditional upon the fulfillment by that state of the 
security needs of its subjects.351 In other words, the principle of ‘sovereignty as 
responsibility’ foresees the existence of a higher international entity to supervise the 
operation of responsible sovereignty and to intervene where the related requirements 
are not met.352 
The provisions of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine have caused much 
debate between the positivists and the moralists, who request a reform in the existing 
legal system. The positivists fiercely support the twin principles of state sovereignty 
and non-intervention, arguing that there are no provisions in the main sources of 
international law allowing humanitarian intervention as an exception to the principle 
of non-intervention. On the other hand, the moralists argue that humanitarian 
intervention is actually not excluded from the existing legal system. Rather, what is 
needed, they argue, is to re-interpret the law explicitly and broadly with a view to 
laying down the necessary criteria for humanitarian intervention.  
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THIRD CHAPTER 
 
AN EVALUATION OF POSSIBLE SOLUTION AND IMPLEMENTATION 
 
I.  ANY PROSPECTS FOR A SOLUTION?          
                                               
In the previous chapters, the problems and contentious points regarding the 
humanitarian intervention were presented. This chapter seeks to put forward some 
humble suggestions with a view their solution. Surely, these suggestions are not 
absolute truths or they have already been refuted by those that are not known to the 
author of this study or they might be called into question by the esteemed readers. 
And as all the ideas in social sciences are conglomerates as well as a deduction of the 
previous assumptions, these solutions shall be highlighted through various pre-
suggested views, either by supporting or criticizing them. 
The problems examined so far arose after the Cold War when a long-standing 
understanding came to surface following attempts to incorporate it into the universal 
humanitarian values. This new humanitarian doctrine, which has come to be known 
as ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ or ‘responsibility to protect’ has caused much 
debate in the scholarly and political circles.  
After the end of the Cold War and the bipolar world, the new international 
structure enabled the Western states to change their security perceptions from the 
requirements of the bi-polar adversaries into a new perception which regarded almost 
every conflict as a threat to international society. Such a change in the global security 
perception increasingly induced interventions into those conflicts. Those 
interventions, even the ones undertaken out of legitimate motives and in legitimate 
manner, conflicted with the international law. The prevalent international legal 
setting, which contradicts the moral standing, is a remnant of the post-World War II 
regulations. The idea after World War II was to regulate the use of force by states 
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within the confines of the international law. The new UN system, generally paying 
lip service to human security, upheld the state over the individual, who was 
effectively left to the mercy of the former. With the end of the Cold War and super 
power rivalry, states have become more interested in human security which offended 
state sovereignty. The humanitarian intervention has increasingly become a widely 
accepted norm in the Western world.353 The demand to establish a right and maybe a 
duty to intervene in other states conflicted with the basic premises of state 
sovereignty and non-intervention of the existing international law, which are 
regarded as shields against the Western domination around the world.  
The swift change of the status quo in the post-Cold War era has required new 
regulations and/or solutions based on new ideas and points of view to reconcile the 
conflicting issues.354 These solutions might be arranged under three topics: decision 
to intervene; the conduct of intervention; and the aftermath of intervention, which is 
currently known as the peace-building phase. These topics are directly related with 
the problems explained in the previous chapter regarding the morality, legality and 
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention.  
The first topic concerns the decision-making process. However, this issue can 
be divided into two: the question of authority, and the question of ‘who should 
intervene?’ 
The prevalent international legal system regards the UN Security Council as 
the sole office to authorize the use of force. And this is the cause of the conflicting 
views, which were observed after the unilateral NATO intervention in Kosovo 
without the authorization of the Security Council. On the one hand, there are those 
who fear the abuse of humanitarian reasons to expand the Western interests around 
the world. And there are those Western states that approach humanitarian 
emergencies on the basis of various concerns, including the internal pressure of their 
constituents, prestige, international security, self-defense and the like. One should 
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seek reconciliation between these two views, since they are representative of the 
existing views on the UN authority concerning the humanitarian intervention. 
One way of rendering the humanitarian intervention legitimate in the eyes of 
those states, which consider the humanitarian intervention as abusing the 
humanitarian cause, might be through adjusting the views on the norms of human 
security and humanitarian intervention.  
Before clarifying that suggestion, a very important and maybe the most 
assertive statement of the study should be presented. As it was depicted at the 
beginning of the study through ‘Melian Dialogue’, the stronger has always found a 
way to establish its will since the beginning of human history, though there has been 
much modification on its modus operandi. As for today, the strong seems to have 
found the way to realize its will, the unilateral action (the one unauthorized by the 
UN), by cooperating with other states, which are of similar economic, political and 
cultural roots as it is seen in the Western World, notwithstanding that some deep 
gaps appear between Europe and the US.  
This study suggests that total ignorance or denial of the Western modus 
operandi on intervention will not be of benefit for those states that are criticizing or 
doubtful of the Western interventionism. However, it should be clearly emphasized 
that this does not mean that these states should adhere to the Western policies in the 
international arena. Rather, a norm or set of rules should be established with the 
consent of both sides. It may be argued that the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine 
was also composed so as to define some set of rules to wage humanitarian war, but 
the point is that it has ignored the consent of states that are against the humanitarian 
intervention.  
For bringing about a mutual consent among those against the intervention and 
that support the necessity of intervention, the norm-making process is a good starting 
point.  
The existing international norms were not readily given to the international 
society; instead they were molded by the interactions of states over time. Similarly a 
new norm of intervention can be established and agreed on. Such a norm should have 
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the necessary provisions to satisfy the considerations of both camps. This satisfaction 
will be the safeguard of maintenance, since a norm lives as long as it is obeyed.355 In 
order to provide this obedience both sides should have an interest in the 
implementation of the norm. This might be achieved when parties consider the 
possible outcomes of establishing a norm with a view to their interests. This is a 
constructivist view as Martha Finnemore claims that states define their interests in 
relation to the prevalent norms.356 Accordingly, if two camps can agree on a norm 
concerning the use of force against humanitarian emergencies, both can see their 
interests within this set of rules.  
Such a norm should allay the fears or concerns of both camps. The non-
Western party, which critical of intervention, should be assured that there is no 
possibility of abuse. One way of providing such assurance might be to involve a legal 
body within the process. When the non-Western states become suspicious of an 
abuse, they will take the issue before this body. This legal body which resembles the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) may be assigned by the Security Council with the 
necessary authority to pass verdict on the issue of abuse. This court may have two 
sub-bodies, both being formed of judges. One of the bodies can be the ruling one 
with members from almost all states represented in the General Assembly. The 
reason for such a large number is to have the possible highest representation of 
states. That body is the one which shall pass a verdict on the submitted case. The 
second body shall be chosen from the first one and it may have 5 to 8 members. 
These members shall regularly rotate. The second body shall have a symbolic role as 
an announcer of the judgments and explanations of the first. If the two third of the 
members of the first body gives verdict of abuse, the defendant state will be found 
guilty of abusing humanitarianism and shall be imposed heavy sanctions. However, it 
should be noted that since great or super powers are strong candidates of potential 
abusers, how sanctions will be imposed on them remains an open and serious 
question. However, even though a coercive sanction cannot be imposed on, for 
instance, the US, it will have the label of abuser and this will greatly undermine its 
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credibility and moral authority within the international society. Its allies or partners 
may even try to avoid cooperating with the US out of similar image concerns or the 
possibility of being subjected to similar verdicts.   
With the establishment of the above body, the Western party can also be 
assured that the humanitarian intervention commenced in line with the agreed 
conditions will be accepted within the international society without opposition. 
Because, in order to apply to the court for the existence of abuse the claimant state or 
states will have to wait for realization of intervention. And since the intervening state 
will be acting on the conditions formerly accepted within the international society 
according to the scenario of this thesis, the intervention will have happened. If there 
is an abuse, the claimants will take the issue before the court. These will constitute 
two ends of the gains by intervention.357 With such an understanding both sides will 
be content with an arrangement whereby the non-Western states shall have the 
opportunity to check and have a word on the application of the norm, and the West 
will be able to get other states incorporated into the process of intervention, which 
will add to the legitimacy of the intervention. An important feature of such a norm 
should be that the legitimacy criterion to be applied has secondary importance to the 
sincerity of states while applying the norm.358 
In addition to these interests that are parts of both parties’ considerations, an 
additional interest which is to be taken into consideration may be found in Eric A. 
Heinze’s argument, which regards human security as a justification to wage a 
humanitarian war.359 Heinze distinguishes human rights and human security. He 
states:  
Human rights are a set of legal processes that entitle individuals access 
to certain goods that are necessary for human well-being, whereas 
human security is a measure of human well-being or the extent to which 
these goods are universally enjoyed.360  
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In other words, the human security precedes human rights as human security 
refers to the physical well being. A person can physically be well and be deprived of 
human rights. But a person cannot enjoy human rights without having physical 
security first. The security of the state which is related to the international security is 
realized by the armed forces through deterrence and self-defense. The main 
consideration of states’ self-defense is actually the protection of their citizens. 
However, when the state cannot protect its citizens, or worse, when the citizens are 
targeted by their own state, the protection of human security becomes an 
international issue.361 Viewing the violation of human security as the necessary 
reason to engage in war can help considerably in deciding whether to intervene or 
not. The protection of human security can serve both camps. 
On the one hand, with regard to the basic assumptions of economics, people 
who suffer from a humanitarian disaster, will not be able to spend on consumption 
and this will lead to the decrease of domestic production and finally to the collapse of 
the economy. This is not something desirable for the West, which has been 
advocating for some time the neo-liberal economic policies around the world that 
require the opening of world markets to the global trade. Secondly, since such 
humanitarian emergencies create huge refugee flows into neighboring countries, as it 
was seen after the first Gulf War, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo and many more cases, 
the refugee problem may threaten the regional and eventually the global security. 
Since many non-Western states cannot overcome all the problems about the refugees 
and related security problems around them, these states need international 
intervention to avoid the suffering before people move to take refuge in them. As 
seen, both parties might seek for their own interests a norm which allows 
intervention under a supervision of both parties.  
Having established the necessity and applicability of a norm recognizing the 
humanitarian intervention as a necessary tool for all parties, a regime should also be 
established to manage those interventions. And at the core of such a regime lies the 
definition of the decision making authority.  
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It is now common knowledge that the UN system has weaknesses in 
regulating inter-state relations, and the necessity for a change has been a common 
concern in the scholarly and political circles.362 The main reason of this weakness 
has been the division between the Security Council’s P-5 members in their response 
to the crises. While the Western members have been generally in the interventionist 
camp, Russia and China have vetoed or at least abstained from any resolution 
authorizing intervention with a selfish concern that someday that interventionist 
weapon might point at them seeking to change their regimes.  
There are different views on reform ranging from the establishment of a new 
international governmental organization (IGO) to the reform of the UN system. 
Firstly, it needs to be stated that this study finds the suggestion related to the reform 
of the UN system more favorable to the one that advocates a new IGO. The reason 
for this preference has two dimensions. Firstly, as mentioned previously, the 
legitimacy of a new organization should be based on the general acceptance of the 
international society, and the representativeness of organization shall be instrumental 
to its legitimacy. Secondly, while there is such an organization with established 
organs (i.e. the UN), it is unnecessary to establish a new organization, since; above 
all, such an effort is likely to be very costly. 
For these reasons this study shall look at the possibilities of reforming the 
existing UN system. One of the noteworthy suggestions was made by Mohammed 
Ayoob in his “Humanitarian Intervention and International Society” and 
“Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty”. He recommends that the UN 
Charter be amended to define and standardize humanitarian intervention so as to 
exclude the incident of selective action and prevent the abuse of such an 
intervention.363 
Ayoob states that the authorization of the humanitarian intervention under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter is not appropriate because Chapter VII was formed to 
avoid inter-state conflict. However, today’s humanitarian emergencies are intra-state 
conflicts which are not dealt with in the provisions of Chapter VII. Ayoob states that 
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new articles should be added to the Charter, clearly defining the conditions under 
which the humanitarian intervention will be permitted.364 He makes two 
recommendations for the reform of the UN body. First of all, he suggests that the 
veto power of the P-5 be cancelled in cases of humanitarian emergencies. And 
secondly, the membership of the Security Council should be expanded and have 
geographic equality in terms of membership distribution. More significantly, he 
suggests the establishment of a new council called “Humanitarian Council” to 
authorize and supervise humanitarian intervention lest the Security Council fails to 
act due to the lack of political will.365 According to him, this new body shall have 50 
members and be capable of authorizing and overseeing the intervention if a two-
thirds majority is achieved, which is currently the number required of the UN 
General Assembly.366 Any intervention realized without this body’s authorization 
will be illegal.367 He also criticizes the scholars who may regard his suggestion  
“unrealistic” and “not adequately sensitive to the realpolitik considerations driving 
the policies of major powers”.368 He argues that the existence of realpolitik concerns 
diminishes the humanitarian character of the intervention.369 
On the other hand, Nicholas Wheeler criticizes Ayoob’s suggestions in his 
article, “Decision-making Rules and Procedures for Humanitarian Intervention”, 
marking the flaws therein. Firstly, he states that Ayoob’s expectation that states will 
leave aside their interests with regards to Realpolitik is unrealistic. He claims that no 
state will risk its soldiers’ lives for the sake of another state’s citizens out of pure 
humanitarian concerns. The motives of the intervening states are generally a 
combination of different elements, which include both self-interest and humanitarian 
concerns.370 
Wheeler also criticizes Ayoob’s suggestion for non-selective interventionism 
as it is not clear. Wheeler asks whether non-selectiveness means that the Western 
powers will never be authorized to intervene in the emergency areas due to their 
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prior selective action or it means the whole UN body will act in every situation, 
which is not realistic due to the scarce resources. The expanded decision making 
body suggested by Ayoob in his article “Humanitarian Intervention and International 
Society” will not handle the selectivity problem as it will only change the 
representation.  Moreover, since whether the intervention will bring more harm or 
good will never be known, there will always be a question of success and doubt, 
which will hinder intervention every time.371  
A reconceptualization of humanitarian intervention, as suggested by Oliver 
Ramsbotham, can be employed to overcome the selective action problem. 
Rambotsham classifies humanitarian intervention as:  
“Coercive governmental humanitarian intervention 
 
(a) Coercive military (forcible) humanitarian intervention 
(b) Coercive non-military humanitarian intervention 
 
Non-coercive governmental humanitarian intervention 
 
(c) Non-coercive military (non-forcible) humanitarian intervention 
(e.g., UN peace-keeping) 
(d) Non-coercive, non-military humanitarian intervention”372 
 
Accordingly, humanitarian intervention concept consists of a range of 
actions, which are non-coercive, non-military, like condemning a state or providing 
food and aid; non-coercive military, like police missions; coercive, non-military, like 
economic sanctions; or coercive, military, like military sanctions and military 
humanitarian intervention.373 Oliver Rambotsham states that since every 
humanitarian crisis has been and will be responded through one of those means, the 
claim to inaction does not have any ground.   
The expansion in the Security Council formation as suggested by Ayoob in 
his article “Humanitarian Intervention and International Society” is not believed to 
cause any change for the better unless the veto power of the P-5 is eliminated.  After 
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such elimination, the existing council may act to intervene effectively. With the 
elimination of the veto impediment, the representativeness should also be expanded 
as suggested by Ayoob. Wheeler agrees with the requirement of expansion, but he 
asks why a minority of liberal democratic states should accept the decisions of the 
non-democratic ones in an institution which decides upon the majority vote.374  
It is clear that none of the P-5 would give up its veto right. Then a regulation 
might be introduced requiring the vetoing state to explain its reasons. This may 
eliminate vetoes not justifiable from the perspective of common good and solely 
based on self-interest concerns. On the other hand, if a vetoing state openly asserts its 
security concerns, the pro-intervention party(ies) may be able to act with a view to 
allaying these concerns.  
There should also be permanent fact-finding committees on sites in addition 
to the ad hoc committees. These permanent committees should directly report to the 
Security Council. One of the P-5 members should be charged with the management 
of these committees subject to periodical shifts. This will shorten the response time 
as normally these committees are bound to the Secretary General, General Assembly 
or sub-bodies within the organization. The duty of these committees will not end 
with the decision of the humanitarian intervention. These committees will continue 
to work on site and report the progress of intervention and the facts about the 
humanitarian emergency. Surely, there is the possibility of pursuing national interests 
through these committees. The members of the committees may try to affect the 
committee reports to cause or to prevent humanitarian intervention. If some of the 
committee members try to induce an intervention by their own state out of 
considerations other than humanitarianism, since there are also members from other 
states in the committee, the latter will report the abuse. And this state will be taken 
before the above mentioned court which will investigate the claims of abuse. On the 
other hand, if some members of the committee try to block humanitarian intervention 
to a country where there are imminent and grave violations of human security like 
systematic, massive killings, tortures, rapes or deportations for a political end, the 
other members of the committee will similarly report the abuse. If such a system 
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works out, it will eliminate some questions of legitimacy regarding the right 
authority criteria.   
As pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, the decision to intervene 
brings about the question of ‘who should intervene?’ The UN does not have armed 
forces of its own and operates through the donations of the members, which are not 
sufficient to finance UN operations in such wide range around the world. Randolph 
C. Kent also points to the problems of the UN to hold its operational role in the 
humanitarian assistance. He suggests a normative role in the humanitarian action for 
the UN, which will not force it to generate financial resources while there are plenty 
of organizations around the world to provide the necessary aid.375 The financial 
problem is valid for the peace and enforcement operations as well. This point was 
accepted by the UN itself, as Boutros-Gali acknowledges in one of his addresses. He 
states that the use of force is not favored and needs to be eliminated within such a 
scarcely financed organization with wide authorities and responsibilities.376  
While there are many IGOs and NGOs to hold humanitarian assistance 
operations, the operation of humanitarian interventions might be born by the regional 
organizations like the NATO, the AU, ECOWAS or ASEAN. 
However, one important point should be clearly defined before continuing. 
As it was told previously, the main criticism with the legitimacy and legality of the 
NATO’s Kosovo intervention was that it was not held with a prior Security Council 
authorization, and it was generally deemed as a legitimate but illegal intervention. 
Since it is presumed that the issue of decision-making process has been more or less 
settled in this study in the sense that a council, either the Security Council or a new 
one, is proposed as the right authority to decide on the humanitarian intervention, the 
problem of intervening agency might be overcome through the implementation of the 
UN Charter, even though any amendments are not made to the UN Charter. Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter states that the Security Council is the authority to define any 
conflict as a threat to global peace and every UN member is obliged to provide the 
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available means to respond to the threat.377 On the other hand, Chapter VIII of the 
UN Charter requires that with the necessary Security Council authorization, regional 
organizations can intervene to the conflicts when necessary.378 Then, when there is 
the Council authority and call of duty, regional organizations, being composed of the 
UN members, have the legitimacy to intervene as long as the humanitarian crises are 
regarded as threats against international peace. 
The NATO is the first organization to consider, as it can hold operations with 
its military and logistics capacity as a truly military organization.379 The EU may 
also be regarded as a regional IGO, but lacks the necessary military capabilities as it 
does not have effective military arrangements. On the other hand, the NATO’s 
original response area already covers the EU region and almost all the EU members 
are members of the NATO.  
Africa, especially its Central and South Eastern parts, is one of the most 
conflictual regions. The regional organizations possibly to operate there are African 
Union and ECOWAS. However, since these two organizations lack the necessary 
financial resources for sufficient action, they are not likely to be effective. On the 
other hand, although these organizations lack the necessary physical capabilities, 
their intervention is likely to be superior in certain respects to the intervention of the 
Western states. With their geographical and cultural proximity to the conflict sites, 
the members of these organizations are more likely to be successful in understanding 
the crises and responding to them.380 On the other hand, as it is seen in Darfur, the 
Western intervention is not welcome in such places as it reminds local peoples of the 
colonization period as well as the religious conflicts in these countries, especially 
Muslim populated ones. The solution might be the financing of these regional 
organizations by the willing Western states. Surely, the possibility of misuse of that 
financial aid in these organizations is a real one and should be taken into 
consideration by the donor states. Then, the UN, as still the legal and legitimate 
arbiter, may allocate some inspectors to oversee the use of resources. However, the 
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UN, while performing this task, should be careful not to be perceived by the local 
people as a colonial governor. Therefore, these inspectors should be very careful to 
keep a low profile both indoors and during onsite inspection. Lastly but not the least, 
these organizations should operate as tools of multilateral intervention and not as 
tools for domination in the neighborhood of a state or group of states.381 The two 
proposed bodies, the permanent fact-finding committees and the court, can be of 
great help in preventing or evaluating also regional attempts to abuse humanitarian 
intervention, if there are any. 
Another point regarding the legitimacy problem is that states do not want to 
risk their soldiers’ lives to save non-citizens. The most highlighted case for this point 
is Kosovo and the NATO’s high altitude bombing. As it was mentioned earlier, the 
NATO command line was highly criticized for not employing ground forces not to 
risk soldiers. There are two reasons for such a strategy of the states. Firstly, there is 
the basic social contract, according to which these soldiers are the citizens who serve 
their country by defending it. Since humanitarian intervention cannot be publicly 
justified with a view to national interests, it does not have the internal legitimacy to 
risk soldiers’ lives. Secondly, according to the proportionality requirement, a 
legitimate intervention is one which is undertaken on the premise that more good 
than harm will come out of it. The loss of soldiers is absolute harm when it is not 
clear to achieve success. This might be another reason for why states are reluctant to 
deploy soldiers in humanitarian wars.  
If the second reason is ignored as a natural mechanism of the legitimization of 
humanitarian intervention, there is a possible way for states to circumvent the 
problem. As it is known, whether it is on voluntary basis or not, military service is 
one of the basic features of the nation state, as serving for the national army is both a 
basic right and duty depending on the conscription model. However, either as a right 
or as a duty, it has its own limits of obligation in terms of the social contract as 
explained above. Since deployment of those soldiers is problematic, another type of 
soldiers might be sourced. A possible solution might be the introduction of private 
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companies to provide mercenaries.382 However, this suggestion has its own serious 
problems. During the last decade or so the private mercenary companies have 
stepped onto the stage and they have already been accused of serious human rights 
violations.383 Such companies, though they are highly controversial, might be the 
solution for risking soldiers’ lives, since mercenaries are not bound by any social 
contract. Rather they act on their own profit and personal interests. They trade their 
martial skills for money. These mercenary groups might be employed by the 
intervening organizations as deployment forces to act in the most dangerous conflict 
areas under the strict command of these organizations. By means of that the 
conventional military forces can remain clear of dangerous missions and be deployed 
in aid distribution or less dangerous police missions. 
While suggesting a model for military humanitarian intervention to cease 
human suffering, a very important point should be stated. Humanitarianism should 
not be mistaken for warmongering against the oppressive regimes. The humanitarian 
intervention is a tool to stop human suffering, and along with the peace building 
actions it also includes the restructuring of social, political, economic and cultural 
institutions of the target state. The humanitarian intervention holds moral 
considerations but these considerations should not lead to the moralist inclination for 
a partisan war against those states which has oppressive regimes. 
Another point is that the obligation of the international society and the 
responsible international institutions is to alleviate problems which result in the 
outbreak of humanitarian emergencies. For instance, the humanitarian crises in 
Somalia and Darfur were caused by nothing but the misallocation of the resources 
and the aid. Accordingly, institutions like the World Bank, which is originally 
mandated to fight against the poverty around the world, can play a global banker 
role. If these conflict-prone regions are provided with the necessary economic 
support to maintain the structures of states, the latter can improve their economic 
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functions, developmental activities and employment levels.384 Through such 
economic support and indirect administrative contributions, state leaders might be 
encouraged to take action on their own as people who know their area better than the 
Westerners, and this might be a cure for the so-called ‘Nirvana Fallacy’.  
The next important point regarding the provision of states’ basic functions in 
terms of economic capabilities is economic sanctions, which are coercive non-
military actions in terms of Rambotsham’s definition.385 When compared to the idea 
of war, economic sanctions seem to be more attractive in terms of saving soldiers’ 
lives and avoiding physical damage on the target state. However, in some situations, 
the final analysis shows that sanctions take heavier toll on civilian life than a possible 
military operation, as it was seen in Iraq conflict from 1991 to the present day.386 
Even though one day it may be possible to resolve the complex problems 
concerning the humanitarian intervention, the duty of the international society does 
not stop there. Though the immediate post-intervention situation may seem better in 
comparison to the pre-intervention situation, there is always a possibility of the re-
emergence of the same or similar humanitarian crisis in the conflict regions. For this 
reason, the definition of humanitarian mission should not be limited to halting the 
atrocities but also include the re-establishment of the state, social and economic life. 
Peace-building and conflict resolution should necessarily be included into the 
definition and provision of humanitarian intervention as people who survive the 
massacres but have no hope for the future will inevitably fall into desperate situations 
and much suffering.  
Although the issue of conflict resolution is outside the scope of this thesis, a 
few words might be meaningful concerning the post-conflict structuring of the target 
state. In the ethnically divided societies, there is always the possibility of recurrence 
of ethnic conflicts, if those ethnic groups are not reconciled in a system which pays 
attention to the governmental, social and economic relations within the society. No 
matter which solution is proposed, it should essentially advocate inclusive and 
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representative institutions that enable and encourage the cooperation and peaceful 
coexistence of those groups. Otherwise, hostilities among parties will endure and 
atrocities may be witnessed one more time.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis attempted to historically analyze the concept of humanitarian 
intervention with regard to its different but related dimensions (legitimacy, morality 
and legality) and to suggest some solutions towards the resolution of chronic 
problems related to it.  
First of all, there is not even a solid definition of humanitarian intervention on 
which there is wide international consensus. Since making such a definition is too 
important a task to be left to the discretion of the interventionists, a commonly 
accepted body like the UN should hold this duty. However, the UN seems to be 
inefficient to fulfill this and the related duties in its current setting. If this problem 
can be solved, the problem of right authority will also be solved since a reformed UN 
with the widest available representation can be regarded as the right authority to 
decide on intervention. This will be a major step towards the resolution of the 
conflict between the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. 
The problems regarding the legitimacy may also be lessened if not totally 
overcome. As to the motives-outcomes debate, the problem is that the claims in 
question, i.e. motives matter and outcomes matter, cannot be easily reconciled. If 
motives are taken as a basis for legitimacy, the outcome is bound to be ignored if it 
involves greater harm. On the other hand, if outcome is taken as a basis, any state 
acting with motives other than humanitarianism and bringing about some good 
unintentionally can claim to have acted on humanitarian motives. Thomas Aquinas’s 
‘double effect doctrine’ can help to solve this problem as he states that good motives 
should result in good outcomes and good outcomes should be obtained through 
intentional, good motives. However, the evaluation of any action should be made 
after it fully comes to an end and the results are obtained. 
As for the problem of proportionality, the good and harm which are likely to 
come out of intervention cannot be totally predicted. Related to the motives-
outcomes debate, while results cannot be known in advance, the debate over 
proportionality can be overcome if all states are keen to act. On the other hand, as for 
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the other dimension of proportionality, the use of appropriate force can materialize 
through the choice of effective and available means. In contrast to Kosovo, if states 
can deploy ground troops as a means of their intervention, intervening states will 
avoid much criticism and generate more good than harm. Given the fact that states 
are reluctant to risk their own soldiers for the sake of foreign civilians, private 
mercenary companies, with the condition of placing them under a strict international 
command and inspection, may prove to be a solution.  
While some problems can be considered and solved separately, some others 
are connected in a complicated manner like selective action. The issue of selective 
action has several dimensions which need to be handled together. Selective action 
results from several factors or considerations: the uncertainty of obtaining a greater 
good; insufficient funds to intervene in every conflict; considering humanitarian 
intervention as a voluntary act, not a duty; and acting with a view to promoting one’s 
own material interests rather than humanitarianism. The previous chapter tried to 
address all those issues directly or indirectly. However, generally speaking inaction 
cannot be defended or suggested as an alternative course of action since there is a 
long continuum of possible actions, ranging from non-military non-coercive to 
military coercive,  to deal with humanitarian conflicts. 
The possibility of Western aid to the suffering societies has created a situation 
in which the governments of those societies do little or nothing to improve the 
situation on the ground. This is called ‘Nirvana Fallacy’. However, these 
governments should not wait for the Westerners to establish and maintain order 
without doing anything themselves, since the same or similar conflicts may erupt 
again after the withdrawal of the Western forces and personnel from their regions. 
Moreover, states neighboring the conflict area (if they are not part of the conflict 
themselves) can diagnose and evaluate the situation better than the Western powers. 
In such situations the West should provide the necessary financial support to the 
neighboring local countries to intervene. 
While the main debate over humanitarian intervention is on the decision and 
conduct of the intervention, the aftermath is generally ignored. First of all, the 
economic structure of the target state should be reinforced in order, among others, to 
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create employment. This can play an important role in preventing the conflict from 
recurring. International actors and particularly the financial institutions should 
assume important roles and duties in this respect. 
Stopping atrocities and suffering does not always prove that the humanitarian 
intervention is successful. The causes of conflict should be addressed in order to 
prevent the re-emergence of the same crisis. This study does not include the options 
of possible conflict resolution mechanisms. However it notes the necessity of 
including peace-building into the humanitarian intervention mission. If the causes of 
conflict are not addressed, the recurrence of atrocities is only a matter of time. 
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